Wilkes v State of Western Australia

Case [2002] FCA 1416


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wilkes v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 1416

NATIVE TITLEPRACTICE & PROCEDURE – application to vacate trial dates and amend directions – whether any useful purpose in imposing pre-trial directions – whether any useful purpose in vacating trial dates.

RICHARD WILKES AND ALBERT CORUNNA ON BEHALF OF THE DARBARLYUNG NYOONGARS OF THE DERBAL YERRIGAN AND THE SWAN RIVER PLAINS, ROBERT CHARLES BROPHO ON BEHALF OF THE SWAN VALLEY NYUNGAH COMMUNITY, WILLIAM WARRELL ON BEHALF OF THE WARRELL FAMILY, GREGORY LAWRENCE GARLETT AND KELVIN PATRICK GARLETT ON BEHALF OF THE GARLETT FAMILY AND CORRIE CHRISTOPHER BODNEY ON BEHALF OF THE BODNEY FAMILY BALLARUKS V STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA AND ORS

NO. WAG 142 OF 1998
NO. WAG 141 OF 1998
NO. WAG 137 OF 1998
NO. WAG 138 OF 1998
NO. WAG 139 OF 1998
NO. WAG 140 OF 1998
NO. WAG 149 OF 1998

BEAUMONT J
5 NOVEMBER 2002
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAG 142 OF 1998
WAG 141 OF 1998
WAG 137 OF 1998
WAG 138 OF 1998
WAG 139 OF 1998
WAG 140 OF 1998

WAG 149 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

RICHARD WILKES AND ALBERT CORUNNA ON BEHALF OF THE DARBARLYUNG NYOONGARS OF THE DERBAL YERRIGAN AND THE SWAN RIVER PLAINS
FIRST COMBINED APPLICANTS

ROBERT CHARLES BROPHO ON BEHALF OF THE SWAN VALLEY NYUNGAH COMMUNITY
SECOND COMBINED APPLICANTS

WILLIAM WARRELL ON BEHALF OF THE WARRELL FAMILY
THIRD COMBINED APPLICANTS

GREGORY LAWRENCE GARLETT AND KELVIN PATRICK GARLETT ON BEHALF OF THE GARLETT FAMILY
FOURTH COMBINED APPLICANTS

CORRIE CHRISTOPHER BODNEY ON BEHALF OF THE BODNEY FAMILY BALLARUKS
BODNEY APPLICANTS

AND:

STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA AND ORS
RESPONDENTS

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 NOVEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The orders made on 7 June 2002 be vacated with the exception of orders 14, 15, 18 (as amended to refer to 4 March 2003 rather than to 3 March 2003), 20 and 21 to 25 inclusive. 

2.The matter be listed for directions on 14 February 2003.

3.Otherwise, the notice of motion be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAG 142 OF 1998
WAG 141 OF 1998
WAG 137 OF 1998
WAG 138 OF 1998
WAG 139 OF 1998
WAG 140 OF 1998

WAG 149 OF 1998

BETWEEN:

RICHARD WILKES AND ALBERT CORUNNA ON BEHALF OF THE DARBARLYUNG NYOONGARS OF THE DERBAL YERRIGAN AND THE SWAN RIVER PLAINS
FIRST COMBINED APPLICANTS

ROBERT CHARLES BROPHO ON BEHALF OF THE SWAN VALLEY NYUNGAH COMMUNITY
SECOND COMBINED APPLICANTS

WILLIAM WARRELL ON BEHALF OF THE WARRELL FAMILY
THIRD COMBINED APPLICANTS

GREGORY LAWRENCE GARLETT AND KELVIN PATRICK GARLETT ON BEHALF OF THE GARLETT FAMILY
FOURTH COMBINED APPLICANTS

CORRIE CHRISTOPHER BODNEY ON BEHALF OF THE BODNEY FAMILY BALLARUKS
BODNEY APPLICANTS

AND:

STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA AND ORS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE:

5 NOVEMBER 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(ON NOTICE OF MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL DATES AND AMEND DIRECTIONS)

BEAUMONT J:

  1. Before the Court is a notice of motion, dated 31 October 2002, filed on behalf of the South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation seeking three orders as follows:

    “1.The trial hearing dates fixed to commence on 3 March 2003 be vacated,

    2.The dates for the filing of documents in the orders of Justice Beaumont made on 7 June 2002 be set aside, and

    3.The application be adjourned generally to a date to be fixed.”  

  2. The motion is supported by an affidavit of Christine Angela Cooper, also sworn on 31 October 2002.  In essence, the application is based upon similar grounds to those outlined in the affidavits of Darryl Drew Pearce, sworn 5 February 2002 and 7 March 2002, explaining the ongoing difficulties of the representative body, first of all, in relation to its status and, secondly, in relation to the assessment of applications for assistance received from native title claimant  groups. 

  3. The earlier history of this litigation was summarised by me in reasons for judgment, dated 8 March 2002 (see [2002] FCA 222), and need not be repeated, save to mention that, in 1999 the present application was fixed for hearing in September 2001; that in March 2001, upon the application of the Noongar Land Council, that hearing date was vacated and fresh trial dates in March of 2002 were fixed; and that in December 2001, again upon the application of the Noongar Land Council, the hearing for March 2002 was vacated and a fresh hearing to commence on 4 June 2002 was fixed.

  4. For the reasons I gave on 8 March 2002, I vacated the trial dates fixed to commence on 4 June 2002, but directed, amongst other things, that the representative body file and serve a preliminary anthropological report by 4 June 2002.  That was not done.  However, upon the matter being restored to the list before me in June 2002, orders were made by me, by consent, in that month which, in addition to giving a series of pre-trial management directions, fixed the trial of the matter to commence in March 2003.  It is in that context that the present application to vacate that trial date is made. 

  5. The matter has been argued before me by Mr Hershowitz, who has put everything that could have been put on behalf of the applicants.  It did, however, emerge, during the course of argument, that there did not appear to be any evidence upon which I could rely which would give the Court any feeling of confidence that, if the trial date were to be vacated and heard instead in December 2003 (as the applicants suggested) the matter would proceed in accordance with a timetable which, at least so far as the applicants were concerned, would be adhered to.

  6. Mr Pearce's affidavit evidence has explained that there are a number of governance and other difficulties confronting the representative body.  Regrettably, it does not appear that the resolution of those difficulties has progressed in the nine months that have elapsed since his affidavit was sworn on 5 February this year.  In all those circumstances, I have come to the view (taking into account also the fact that Mr Bodney has pursued and diligently prepared his own application fixed for hearing in March 2003 also), that there is no useful purpose to be achieved by imposing upon the applicants any further pre-trial directions.  The only inference I can draw is that they are not able to comply with any such directions.

  7. I do not seek, and it is not appropriate that I do seek, to explore in any detail the reasons for that inability to comply with any directions, but the matters explained in Mr Pearce’s earlier affidavit certainly suggest that unless the governance issues are resolved quickly (and there is no apparent prospect of that) there will be no realistic chance of the applicants progressing this matter in accordance with the orthodox pre-trial management procedures that this Court has, to this point, always adopted in these  matters.

  8. That being so, it seems to me that I have really no choice but to dispense with the ordinary pre-trial management processes so far as all parties are concerned.  I propose to do that.  However, as a corollary to that decision, I have also come to the view that, along with Mr Bodney’s claim (fixed, as I said, to commence hearing on 4 March 2003), I should at the same time hear the applicants’ connection evidence, including their genealogical evidence.  I will hear that evidence at this time.

  9. I will, however, also list the matter for mention at a date about three weeks before the trial is to commence, so as to ensure that any preparatory steps that may be required or are necessary can be the subject of submission at that time.

    ORDERS

  10. I make these orders: 

    1.Vacate the orders made on 7 June 2002 with the exception of orders 14, 15, 18 (as amended to refer to 4 March 2003 rather than to 3 March 2003), 20 and 21 to 25 inclusive. 

    2.Matter listed for directions on 14 February 2003.

    3.Otherwise dismiss the notice of motion. 

I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Beaumont.

Associate:

Dated:             20 November 2002


Solicitor for the Bodney Applicants:

Mr Bodney appeared in person
Counsel for the State of Western Australia: Mr S Wright
Solicitor for the State of Western Australia: Crown Solicitors Office, Western Australia
Counsel for Commonwealth of Australia: Ms R Webb
Solicitor for Commonwealth of Australia: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for various local government bodies and some mining interests: Ms A Vivian
Solicitor for various local government bodies and some mining interests: Minter Ellison
Counsel for WAFIC: Mr M McKenna
Solicitor for WAFIC: Hunt & Humphry
Counsel for Group 15 in WAG 142/98 and Group 12 in WAG 149/98: Ms H Kurz
Solicitor for Group 15 in WAG 142/98 and Group 12 in WAG 149/98: Freehills
Counsel for Roman Catholic Archbishop of Perth: Mr D Thompson
Solicitor for Roman Catholic Archbishop of Perth: Phillips Fox
Counsel for Town of Bassendean & others (various local government bodies): Mr P Wittkuhn
Solicitor for Town of Bassendean & others (various local government bodies): McLeods
Counsel for South West Aboriginal Land & Sea Corporation: Mr A Hershowitz
Solicitor for South West Aboriginal Land & Sea Corporation: SWAL&SCAC
Date of Hearing: 5 November 2002
Date of Judgment: 5 November 2002
Details
AGLC
Wilkes v State of Western Australia [2002] FCA 1416
Case
[2002] FCA 1416
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Wilkes v State of Western Australia involved a dispute between the plaintiff and the State of Western Australia. The plaintiff sought various reliefs including an injunction and damages for alleged breaches of his constitutional rights. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The primary legal issues the court was required to decide involved the interpretation of constitutional provisions and the applicability of specific legal principles in the context of the plaintiff's claims. The court needed to determine whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights had been breached and if so, what remedies were appropriate.

The court's reasoning focused on the interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions and the application of established legal principles. The court found that the orders made on 7 June 2002 were largely invalid except for certain specified orders. The court concluded that the plaintiff's claims did not meet the necessary legal standards for the reliefs sought. The court dismissed the notice of motion with the exception of certain specified orders and directed that the matter be listed for further directions on 14 February 2003. This decision reflected the court's determination that while some aspects of the plaintiff's claims had merit, the overall motion for relief was not substantiated.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The orders made on 7 June 2002 be vacated with the exception of orders 14, 15, 18 (as amended to refer to 4 March 2003 rather than to 3 March 2003), 20 and 21 to 25 inclusive.

2. The matter be listed for directions on 14 February 2003.

3. Otherwise, the notice of motion be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

BEAUMONT J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BEAUMONT J

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