Wecker v The Delegate (the decision maker) to the President (Mr S Kerkyashrian) of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board

The case of Wecker v The Delegate to the President of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board involved a dispute regarding the handling of complaints of unlawful discrimination based on disability. The plaintiff, Mr. Wecker, sought orders under section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 for his complaints, which were declined under section 89B of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, to be listed for leave to appeal to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal or referred to a judicial member of the Tribunal. The crux of the case revolved around the interpretation of the statutory provisions and whether the Limitation Act 1969 applied to complaints under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, particularly in relation to section 52 of the Limitation Act 1969 and its impact on the discretion to decline complaints of disability discrimination under section 89B of the Anti-Discrimination Act. The plaintiff argued that he had a legitimate expectation that his complaints would be referred to the Tribunal and that there was a duty requiring such complaints to be referred.

The court had to determine whether the Limitation Act 1969 imposed limitations on the discretion to decline complaints of disability discrimination under section 89B of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 and if there was a duty to refer such complaints to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. The central issue was whether the statutory framework provided a legitimate expectation that complaints declined under section 89B would be referred to the Tribunal and whether this expectation was enforceable. The court was also tasked with interpreting the relevant statutes to ascertain the rights and obligations of the parties involved.

In its reasoning, the court considered the statutory language and legislative intent behind both the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 and the Limitation Act 1969. The court concluded that section 52 of the Limitation Act 1969 did not limit the discretion to decline complaints of disability discrimination under section 89B of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. The court found that there was no legitimate expectation that complaints declined under section 89B would automatically be referred to the Tribunal. Consequently, the court determined that there was no duty to refer such complaints, and the plaintiff's application for orders was dismissed. The court held that the statutory provisions did not create an enforceable expectation of referral to the Tribunal for complaints declined under section 89B.