Webster & Anor v Lampard

In the High Court of Australia, the appellants, Webster and another, brought a claim against the respondent, Lampard, for wrongful threat of arrest, wrongful eviction from a leasehold, and trespass. The respondent, a police officer, asserted that he was acting in pursuance of his public duties under the *Police Act* of Western Australia and section 47A of the *Limitation Act* of that State, and that he acted in good faith and without corruption or malice. The appellants, in their reply, denied that the respondent was acting in the execution of his duty, thereby challenging his entitlement to the protection of these limitation provisions.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the onus of proof regarding whether the respondent was acting in the execution of his duty. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia had held that the onus lay on the appellants to disprove that the respondent was acting in pursuance of his duties, relying on decisions from the English Court of Appeal in *G. Scammell & Nephew Limited v Hurley* and the High Court itself in *Hamilton v Halesworth* and *Trobridge v Hardy*. The appellants argued that this finding regarding the onus of proof was erroneous.

The appellants contended that the general principle of the law of evidence supported their position, and they sought to distinguish the weight of certain historical cases, including *Newell v Starkey*, *G. Scammell*, and *Hamilton v Halesworth*, which they acknowledged were against their submission. They argued that the error in these cases had led to the incorrect imposition of the onus on the appellants to disprove the respondent's assertion of acting in the execution of his duty. The appellants submitted that the determination of whether the respondent was acting within the performance of his duties was crucial, as it served as the trigger for the application of the relevant limitation provisions.