Webb v Department for Correctional Services

The applicant, a prisoner serving a life sentence, sought judicial review of a decision by the Chief Executive of the Department for Correctional Services to refuse his requests for a computer, printer, and access to legal websites for use in his cell. The applicant, unrepresented and without legal training, argued that such access was necessary for him to properly represent himself in various legal proceedings he had initiated against the Department. The Department applied for summary judgment, asserting that the applicant's claim lacked legal merit and that the issue had already been determined against him in prior court proceedings.

The central legal issue before the court was whether there was a reasonable basis for the applicant's judicial review action, specifically whether the Department had a legal duty to provide prisoners with access to computing and legal resources to facilitate self-representation, and whether the Chief Executive's refusal of such requests was amenable to judicial review. The court was required to determine if the applicant had a reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting his claim, considering the Department's contention that the matter had been previously adjudicated.

The single judge granted summary judgment in favour of the Department, reasoning that the applicant bore the onus of establishing a reasonable basis for his action and that the test was whether there was a reasonable or real prospect of success. Her Honour found that the applicant was seeking to litigate an issue that had already been argued and refused in both the Magistrates Court and the Supreme Court. Consequently, the judge concluded that there was no reasonable basis for the judicial review action, as the appropriate forum for ensuring reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial was the trial court itself, and that the applicant's pursuit of the same matter in other proceedings constrained any exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction.

The applicant appealed this decision, arguing that the single judge erred by treating the issue as determined in prior proceedings, as those cases concerned specific requests within particular proceedings, whereas his current claim was for general, ongoing access. He also reiterated his arguments regarding the Department's duty to facilitate access to legal resources. The Court of Appeal granted the applicant an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, as the extension was unopposed and an explanation for the delay had been provided.