Waterhouse v The Queen

This matter came before the High Court of Australia on an application for special leave to appeal by Robert William Waterhouse against the Crown. The dispute concerned the applicant's conviction for perjury. The applicant contended that the Racing Appeals Tribunal lacked the power to administer an oath, and therefore, there was no lawful basis for a perjury conviction arising from evidence given before it.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Racing Appeals Tribunal, or a person acting as such, possessed the authority to administer an oath. This question hinged on the interpretation of the relevant legislation, specifically the Racing Appeals Tribunal Act and its Regulations, and the application of the Interpretation Act. The applicant argued that the absence of an express power to administer an oath within the Tribunal's governing legislation evinced a legislative intention against such a power, and that the Interpretation Act did not confer this power when the individual was acting as a tribunal rather than merely as a person.

The applicant's counsel submitted that a distinction exists between a person and a tribunal in the context of administering oaths, citing *Shuttleworth* as analogous. In that case, the Victorian Supreme Court distinguished between a Clerk of Petty Sessions and the court itself, holding that while the Clerk might not have had personal power, he acted as an agent of the court which did. The applicant argued that the Racing Appeals Tribunal, in this instance, was acting as a tribunal, and the legislation did not grant it the power to administer an oath, making the perjury conviction invalid. The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the consequences arising from the power to administer an oath, particularly in relation to the severity of penalties for perjury.