Walker v Floyd & FAI

In the case of Walker v. Floyd & FAI, the plaintiff, Peter James Walker, sought judgment for damages for personal injuries that were to be assessed. The defendants, Angela Karen Louise Floyd and FAI General Insurance Company, had admitted to the facts of the collision, the negligence of the first defendant, and the resultant personal injuries and other losses suffered by the plaintiff. However, the extent of the injuries and the economic and other effects of the accident were denied by the defendants. The plaintiff applied for judgment for damages to be assessed under Order 36 rule 5. The court was required to determine whether it should enter a judgment for damages to be assessed and whether the matter should be remitted to the District Court for the assessment of damages.

The court considered the long-standing practice of granting judgment for damages to be assessed in personal injury cases, despite some misgivings in later decisions. It was noted that an admission of negligence and damage was considered a question of mixed fact and law, and the court was invited to depart from the established practice. However, the court decided not to depart from the practice due to its long-standing nature. The court also considered the implications of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 and the requirements of insurers to notify whether liability is admitted or denied. It was argued that if the matter were to be heard as an assessment, the plaintiff would not be obliged to provide or update a Statement of Loss and Damage, and there was no provision for a certificate of readiness, which could result in the action being brought on before the defendant was ready and without sufficient information to make an informed offer to settle. However, the court found that the objections were partly academic as an Order 39 rule 29A statement had been supplied.

The court concluded that it was highly desirable for there to be an adequate interchange of information to enable the basis for resolving the claim to be explored. It was noted that Division 4 of Part 4 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act already provided for reciprocal duties of cooperation between insurer and claimant, but procedural steps such as interrogatories and discovery were not replicated in Division 4. The court also noted that Order 36 rule 5 gave it a wide power upon an application for judgment to make such order or give such judgment as may be just. The court decided that it had the power to make the orders relating to interlocutory steps, which had been requested.

Finally, the court considered the terms of the order sought, which included an order that the matter be remitted to the District Court for assessment of damages. The court decided that the matter should remain in the Supreme Court for the assessment of damages. The court made the following orders: (1) Judgment was entered in the action against the second defendant for damages to be assessed; (2) the assessment would be made by a Judge of the Supreme Court; (3) the action would not be placed on the callover list until the parties had executed and filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial; (4) the plaintiff would comply with Division 3A of Order 39 in relation to the updating of the plaintiff's Statement of Loss and Damage; and (5) the costs of and incidental to the application were the parties' costs in the cause.