Waldon and Kipley-Waldon (No. 3)

This matter concerned an application by the former husband to review and set aside orders made by the Family Court on 19 May 2014, which had summarily dismissed his substantive application to set aside consent property orders made on 5 January 2012. The parties, born in 1948, married in 1971, separated in 2009, and their marriage was dissolved in 2012. The former husband's initial application in March 2013 was unclear, but after obtaining legal advice, he sought to set aside the 2012 consent property orders and have property issues determined. The former wife sought summary dismissal of these proceedings, arguing they had no reasonable likelihood of success and were frivolous or vexatious, which the Court granted on 19 May 2014.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether it possessed the jurisdiction to review or set aside its own decree of 19 May 2014. The former husband contended that such power existed. The Court also had to consider the former husband's subsequent applications, filed out of time, which sought to vacate the 19 May 2014 orders, have the original consent property orders set aside, and address various other matters including the release of funds, costs, security for costs, and the expedited hearing of property proceedings with specific valuations.

The Court reasoned that the orders of 19 May 2014 were final orders dismissing the former husband's substantive application, not property orders themselves. Section 94 of the *Family Law Act 1975* provides a right of appeal from a decree of a single judge exercising original jurisdiction. However, the Court found that the orders of 19 May 2014 were not appealable under s 94 as they were not property orders. The Court determined that it lacked the legislative or other power to consider the husband’s application to review and set aside or vary the 19 May 2014 orders, as his substantive proceedings had been brought to an end by that dismissal, save for reserved matters of costs and interlocutory orders.