Victorian Chamber of Manufactures v Commonwealth (Industrial Lighting Regulations)

The Victorian Chamber of Manufactures and two proprietary companies brought an action in the High Court against the Commonwealth and the Minister for Labour and National Service. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the National Security (Industrial Lighting) Regulations and an order made by the Minister under those regulations, alleging that they were unreasonable and not authorised by the National Security Act 1939-1940, nor by any power conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament by the Constitution. The defendants demurred to the statement of claim.

The legal issues before the court were whether the National Security (Industrial Lighting) Regulations were authorised by the National Security Act 1939-1940, and whether they fell within the defence power of the Commonwealth Parliament as granted by the Constitution. A further issue raised by some of the judges was whether Regulation 7 of the Industrial Lighting Regulations contravened Section 71 of the Constitution by vesting judicial power in a Minister. The court was also required to consider the application of Section 46(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901-1941, which provides for the reading down of regulations to the extent that they are not in excess of the power conferred.

A majority of the High Court (Latham C.J., McTiernan and Williams JJ.) held that the National Security (Industrial Lighting) Regulations were not authorised by the National Security Act 1939-1940 and were beyond the defence power of the Commonwealth Parliament. They reasoned that while good lighting might contribute to industrial efficiency, and industrial efficiency is important in wartime, the regulations did not have a sufficiently direct or real connection to the defence of the Commonwealth. The regulations were seen as a broad regulation of industrial lighting conditions, which fell outside the scope of the defence power and encroached upon matters more appropriately dealt with by State legislation. Starke J. and Latham C.J. (semble) also considered that Regulation 7, which allowed the Minister to close premises without a court hearing, involved an unlawful vesting of judicial power in the Minister, contrary to Section 71 of the Constitution.

The court found that the Regulations, as framed, were not saved by Section 46(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901-1941 because they did not exhibit an intention to apply only to premises within the Governor-General's power while also purporting to apply to premises outside that power; rather, they imposed duties on all premises within the definition of industrial premises as a single class. Consequently, the demurrer was disallowed, and the plaintiffs were entitled to declarations that the Regulations and the Minister's order were void and of no effect, along with an injunction restraining the Minister from enforcing the order.