Veeravarman and Comcare (Compensation)

This matter concerned an application by Mr Veeravarman for an extension of time to seek a review of a decision made by Comcare. The decision in question was made on 1 March 2016, and Mr Veeravarman sought to lodge his application for review approximately eighteen months later, on 25 October 2017. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was required to consider whether to grant this extension.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances to extend the time for Mr Veeravarman to lodge his application for review, pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). This required the Tribunal to consider the statutory modification in section 64(4) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), which prescribed a 60-day period for making such an application after receiving the decision.

The Tribunal applied the principles established in *Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd & Ors v The Hon Barry Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment* (1984) 3 FCR 344, which indicate that there is a prima facie rule against entertaining proceedings commenced outside the prescribed period. This requires an applicant to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and demonstrate that it is fair and equitable to extend the time. Factors to consider include the length of the delay, whether the applicant has rested on their rights, awareness of appeal rights, prejudice to the respondent, the merits of the substantive case, and fairness to others in a similar position. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had not provided evidence of any correspondence or agitation indicating dissatisfaction during the intervening period, and that Comcare was entitled to conclude the matter was finalised. The Tribunal emphasised the importance of finality in legal proceedings, as reflected in statutory time limits.

The Tribunal refused Mr Veeravarman's application for an extension of time, finding that the substantial delay of 528 days beyond the prescribed 60-day period was not reasonable in all the circumstances.