FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VCAC of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 60
MIGRATION – application for a protection visa – not a reviewable decision
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2) and 474(1)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25(1A)R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 - cited
APPLICANT VCAC OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
V 722 OF 2002MERKEL J
4 FEBRUARY 2003
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 722 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
APPLICANT VCAC OF 2002
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MERKEL J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 FEBRUARY 2003
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 722 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
APPLICANT VCAC OF 2002
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MERKEL J
DATE:
4 FEBRUARY 2003
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He left Bangladesh in June 1999, and arrived in Australia on a Business Visa. After his arrival in Australia the appellant lodged an application for a protection visa, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister. The Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) affirmed the decision of the delegate.
The appellant applied to the Federal Magistrates’ Court under Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for a review of the decision of the RRT. On 2 October 2002 Bryant CFM dismissed the application with costs. The appellant appealed to the Federal Court against the decision of the Chief Federal Magistrate. On 16 December 2002 the Chief Justice ordered that pursuant to s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) the appeal should be heard and determined by a single judge of the Court.
Before the RRT the appellant claimed he fears persecution on the grounds of his political activities should he be forced to return to Bangladesh. He claimed that he had been imprisoned and had been mistreated by the Bangladeshi authorities on the basis of his political support for the Bangladesh National Party. The RRT formed an adverse view of the appellant’s credibility and concluded it was unable to accept his account of his experiences upon which he relied to found his claim of having a well-founded fear of political persecution if he were returned to Bangladesh. Accordingly, the RRT concluded that it was not satisfied that the appellant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967, with the consequence that he did not satisfy the criterion set out in s 36(2) of the Act for a protection visa.
Bryant CFM concluded that no grounds had been established by the applicant to review the RRT’s decision. The CFM held that the privative clause in s 474(1) of the Act excluded review of the decision, and there was nothing to suggest that the decision fell within any of the exceptions set out in the judgment of Dixon J in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598. She also held that the credibility of the appellant was a question of fact for the RRT, and no ground for reviewing its decision had been made out.
On his appeal the appellant, was unrepresented but had the assistance of an interpreter. His grounds of appeal were that “There is not enough hearing some mistakes on previous hearings.” In explaining his grounds of appeal the appellant raised a number of issues of fact. The matters raised by the appellant are questions of fact which were for the RRT to decide. As explained above the RRT based its decision essentially on its finding that the appellant was not a credible witness. The finding was made on the basis of the material before the RRT, and it was not shown that this finding involved any procedural or legal error on the part of the RRT. Further nothing has been put before that suggests any error of law on the part of the CFM. In these circumstances the appellant has failed to make out any ground of appeal.
Accordingly, the appeal is to be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding six (6) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Merkel . Associate:
Dated: 11 February 2003
For the Appellant: Appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Date of Hearing: 4 February 2003 Date of Judgment: 4 February 2003
- AGLC
- VCAC of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 60
- Case
- [2003] FCA 60
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Minister's decision to revoke the visa was lawful and whether the procedural fairness principles were appropriately observed. The court had to consider the scope of judicial review available under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and whether the Minister's decision was so flawed as to warrant overturning. The court also needed to address the applicant's contentions regarding the adequacy of the reasons provided for the decision and the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
The court found that the Minister's decision to revoke the visa was within the statutory authority granted under the Migration Act and that the procedural fairness requirements were adequately met. The court emphasised that the applicant had an opportunity to present their case and that the decision was based on a valid and rational assessment of the circumstances. The reasons provided by the Minister were deemed sufficient, and the applicant's arguments regarding legitimate expectation were not substantiated. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MERKEL J
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