Valerie Constance Chapman v Dongmei Yang and Mark Seton Chapman and Geoffrey John Chapman, Executors of the Will of the Late Edward Charles Chapman

The Court of Appeal of the Australian Capital Territory heard an appeal by Valerie Constance Chapman against a decision of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. Ms Chapman had applied under the *Family Provision Act 1969* (ACT) for provision out of the estate of her late husband, Edward Charles Chapman. The executors of the estate, the deceased's sons Mark Seton Chapman and Geoffrey John Chapman, and the primary beneficiary of the will, Dongmei Yang, were the respondents. Ms Chapman sought to set aside the primary judge's dismissal of her application and sought a declaration that she was entitled to provision from the estate, specifically a legacy of $250,000.

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the deceased had made adequate provision for Ms Chapman in his will, thereby dismissing her application under the *Family Provision Act 1969*. This involved determining the correct approach to assessing whether a deceased's will made adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education, or advancement in life of an eligible applicant, considering the applicant's financial position, the size and nature of the estate, and the totality of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased, as well as the deceased's relationships with other potential beneficiaries.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the primary judge's reasoning, holding that the statutory test under section 8 of the *Family Provision Act 1969* was the correct one to apply, rather than a "moral duty" gloss. The primary judge had found that despite the long separation of the parties since 1979 and the deceased's subsequent de facto relationship, Ms Chapman was adequately provided for. This conclusion was based on the fact that the parties had achieved a fair property settlement upon separation, the deceased had gifted Ms Chapman a substantial sum from his retirement benefits in 1993, and she continued to receive a significant portion of his superannuation pension for life. The Court found that Ms Chapman's own financial resources, including property and investments, were sufficient to meet her needs, and her preference for a more expensive future residence did not establish a need for further provision from the estate.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Chapman's appeal. The Court also made orders regarding costs, requiring Ms Chapman to pay the costs of the respondent Dongmei Yang on a party-party basis, and on an indemnity basis from a specified date, reflecting pre-trial offers made by Ms Yang. The costs of the executors were to be paid out of the estate.