Urbaniak-Bak v Council of the Law Society of the Act and “RA”

The applicant, Urbaniak-Bak, sought leave to appeal out of time from an original order made by consent in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (ACAT). The respondents to the application were the Council of the Law Society of the ACT and another party referred to as “RA”. The dispute centred around the applicant's dissatisfaction with the handling of a complaint she had lodged against a legal practitioner, which was being considered by the Complaints Committee of the ACT Law Society. The applicant wanted the ACAT to investigate the authenticity and validity of a document that was used as evidence in her case, and sought orders to revoke the decision of the Complaints Committee and refer her complaint to the ACT Law Society Council.

The legal issues before the court included whether the application for leave to appeal out of time should be granted, considering the principles to be applied in such circumstances, and whether a consent order can be appealed. The court also needed to consider the reasons for the delay in filing the application, whether there was any prejudice to the respondents, and the merits of the proposed appeal. The court had to determine whether there was a miscarriage of justice that would warrant allowing the appeal despite the delay.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal out of time, noting that the outcome the applicant sought had already been achieved through the consent order. The court considered the principles for granting such leave, including the reasons for the delay, any prejudice to the respondents, and the merits of the proposed appeal. The court found that the applicant had not provided satisfactory reasons for the delay, and that the respondents would be prejudiced if the appeal was allowed. The court also noted that there was no miscarriage of justice that would warrant allowing the appeal despite the delay.

The final orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal out of time be dismissed. The court did not provide further orders as the substantive issue had already been resolved by the consent order.