Tulloh v Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Corrective Services

In the matter of Tulloh v Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Corrective Services, the respondent sought damages for wrongful imprisonment against the respondent, who was the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Corrective Services. The respondent alleged that he was unlawfully detained by the Chief Executive Officer from 4 July 2014 to 22 September 2014. The primary issue was whether the Chief Executive Officer had lawful authority to detain the respondent prior to the Board’s Cancellation Order being quashed. The hearing proceeded on the basis that if the Board's Cancellation Order was a nullity, then the Chief Executive Officer had no lawful authority to detain the respondent after 8 December 2012. However, if the decision had effect until quashed, then the Chief Executive Officer had lawful authority to detain the respondent until the court quashed the Board's Cancellation Order on 4 July 2014.

The court considered that an administrative decision which involves jurisdictional error is legally invalid. However, an administrative decision which is legally invalid does not necessarily have no legal effect unless and until it is set aside or declared to be invalid. Whether a legally invalid decision has any relevant legal effect before it is set aside or declared to be invalid depends upon the statutory framework under which and the context in which the decision is made. The court held that the Board's Cancellation Order had no legal effect from its inception, subject perhaps to the need to consider the context and the legislation under which the decision was made. Therefore, the Chief Executive Officer had no lawful authority to detain the respondent after 8 December 2012. The court found that the Chief Executive Officer had lawful authority to detain the respondent from 4 July 2014 to 22 September 2014, when the writ of habeas corpus was granted.

The court ordered that the proceedings be dismissed with costs to be paid by the respondent to the Chief Executive Officer. The court held that the Chief Executive Officer was protected from personal liability for torts under section 120 of the SA Act 2003. The court found that the Chief Executive Officer was not liable for the tort of wrongful imprisonment because he had acted in good faith in the performance or purported performance of a function under the SA Act 2003 or the Sentencing Act 1995. The court held that the Chief Executive Officer was not liable for the tort of wrongful imprisonment because he had acted in good faith in the performance or purported performance of a function under the SA Act 2003 or the Sentencing Act 1995.