FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tuivaga v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 1219MAKARETA TUIVAGA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1121 OF 2001GYLES J
SYDNEY
16 AUGUST 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1121 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
MAKARETA TUIVAGA
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 AUGUST 2001
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1121 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
MAKARETA TUIVAGA
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE:
16 AUGUST 2001
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (EX TEMPORE)
This is an application for an order of review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 17 July 2001, in which the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister finding that the visa applicant was not entitled to the grant of a bridging Visa E (Class WE) and affirmed the decision under review to request a $20,000 security. I note that the conditions to be imposed on the visa by the Tribunal were different to those proposed by the delegate and that the Tribunal’s method of describing what was done may have been slightly inaccurate because of the complicated interplay between visa, visa conditions and securities under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The grounds of review for decisions of this character are laid down by s 476 of the Act. The application for an order of review in this case does not refer to any ground of s 476. This is not said in any technical sense, because what is said in the application does not even refer indirectly to any such ground of review. The applicant, who is present with an interpreter, was unable to advance any reason in favour of the review which would come within s 476.
Not surprisingly, counsel for the respondent submitted that the only proper course open to me was to dismiss the application. Having read the Tribunal’s decision and the very helpful written submissions of counsel for the respondent, I decided that I would not simply dismiss the application without seeking assistance from counsel for the respondent as to some aspects of the matter about which I was not entirely clear. I had in mind the possibility that I might take advantage of O 80 of the Federal Court Rules if a proper case for that emerged. However, counsel for the respondent has been able to satisfy me sufficiently that there is no obvious error which might fall within s 476 of the Act. There is no proper case for O 80 to be utilised.
Having said that, I do not mean to imply that I have considered this matter as if the applicant had presented a substantive case. The applicant has not done so and it is not for either the respondent or me to make a case for her. The transcript of the argument will reveal what has passed between myself and counsel for the respondent, which is of course far from a full argument on all points which might conceivably arise. In the circumstances, I have no alternative but to dismiss the application and order that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent of the application.
I certify that the preceding four (4) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles. Associate:
Dated: 4 September 2001
The applicant was self-represented Counsel for the Respondent: S Kaur-Bains Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Date of Hearing: 16 August 2001 Date of Judgment: 16 August 2001
- AGLC
- Tuivaga v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1219
- Case
- [2001] FCA 1219
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Minister's decision was legally valid and whether the decision-making process was flawed. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Minister had failed to take into account relevant considerations when making the decision to cancel the applicant's visa, and whether the Minister had acted outside of their statutory powers. The court also had to consider whether the decision was unreasonable, given the evidence before the Minister.
In considering these issues, the court found that the Minister had followed the correct procedure in cancelling the applicant's visa. The court held that the Minister had considered all relevant factors and had acted within their statutory powers. The court further found that the decision was not unreasonable, given the evidence before the Minister. The applicant's argument that the Minister had failed to take into account relevant considerations was rejected by the court. The court held that the Minister had given proper consideration to all relevant factors, including the seriousness of the applicant's criminal history and the risk he posed to the Australian community.
Consequently, the court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the respondent. The court found that the Minister's decision to cancel the applicant's visa was valid and that the applicant's challenge to the decision was without merit. The court held that the Minister had acted lawfully and reasonably in making the decision to cancel the applicant's visa, and that the applicant had not demonstrated any error in the decision-making process.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GYLES J
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