Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor

The case of Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor involved an application by Together Queensland, an employee organisation, to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission to amend a published decision by the Commission to remove the name of its member from the decision or to apply a pseudonym instead. The application was dismissed by the Industrial Court. The primary legal issue was whether the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission had the power to amend a published decision for the reasons advanced by the Applicant. The court also considered the principles applicable when the Commission might exercise such a power and whether the Applicant had demonstrated that an order should be made.

The court found that the Applicant's submission that section 451 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 conferred power on the Commission to amend the decision was too general and lacked particularity. The court noted that the Applicant did not provide any detailed analysis or reference to specific sub-sections of the Act that conferred such power. Similarly, the submissions from the opposing party, Mr Smith, were also insufficiently detailed. The court concluded that without proper argument, it was unwilling to decide whether section 451 conferred discretionary power on the Commission to amend a published decision for the reasons advanced by the Applicant. Even if such power existed, the court found that the principles governing such applications did not support granting the order sought by the Applicant. The court referenced established principles about the importance of open justice and the limited circumstances in which suppression orders may be made. The court found that the circumstances did not warrant departing from the principle of open justice.

The court's reasoning was based on the principle that courts are generally open to the public and that the exclusion of public access is only effected in exceptional cases. The court noted that embarrassment or distress to those referred to in court processes is a price the community pays for the benefit of open justice. The court found that the Applicant had not demonstrated that an order should be made in this case, as the principles of open justice applied. The application was dismissed.