Theo and Theo

In *Theo & Theo*, the applicant husband sought orders from the Family Court of Australia directing various Commonwealth government agencies and a Norwegian insurance office to disclose information regarding the whereabouts of the respondent wife. The dispute arose in the context of ongoing litigation concerning property adjustment orders and a subsequent costs order that had been set aside on appeal, resulting in an order for the wife to repay $200,000 to the husband. The husband was unable to locate the wife to enforce this repayment.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether it possessed the statutory power to compel third parties, including government instrumentalities, to provide information about a party's location in proceedings that were not related to parenting matters. The husband's solicitor conceded that no express power existed within the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) for such an order. The Court was required to consider the scope of powers under Part VII of the Act, specifically concerning Commonwealth Information Orders, and Part VIIIAA, which deals with orders and injunctions binding third parties.

Justice Forrest reasoned that the provisions in Part VII of the Act, such as sections 67J and 67N, which allow for Commonwealth Information Orders, are expressly limited to locating a child for the purposes of parenting proceedings. These provisions were therefore not applicable to the present case, which concerned the enforcement of a debt arising from costs orders. Similarly, the Court found no assistance in Part VIIIAA, particularly section 90AF, which allows for orders or injunctions binding third parties in relation to property division. The Court held that the pre-conditions for making such orders under section 90AF(3) were not met, as final property division orders had already been made and the current proceedings were unrelated to dividing property. The Court also rejected the argument that it possessed inherent power to make such orders, affirming that the Family Court is a creature of statute with limited jurisdiction.

Consequently, the Court concluded that it lacked the necessary power to grant the orders sought by the husband. The application was therefore dismissed.