The State of South Australia (in Right of the Department for Health and Ageing (SA Ambulance Service)) v Dohnt

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Kourakis CJ, Parker and Livesey JJ, heard an appeal concerning the interpretation of the *Return to Work Act 2014* (SA) in relation to workers' compensation claims. The appeal was brought by the State of South Australia (in Right of the Department for Health and Ageing (SA Ambulance Service)) against decisions of the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal. The dispute centred on whether certain increases in remuneration could be taken into account when adjusting a worker's average weekly earnings (AWE) for the purposes of calculating their notional weekly earnings (NWE) under the Act.

The legal issues before the Court were primarily concerned with the proper construction of sections 45 and 47 of the *Return to Work Act 2014*. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether section 45(1)(a), which permits adjustments to AWE for changes in remuneration, applied to the circumstances of the workers, or if the more specific provisions of section 47, which relate to changes in remuneration rates and are confined to seriously injured workers, were exhaustive. A further issue was whether the definition of "weekly wage" in section 5(15)(a) included allowances.

The Court allowed the appeal, holding that section 47 of the Act, by conferring a specific power to adjust weekly payments for seriously injured workers on account of changes to remuneration, precluded the operation of the broader power under section 45(1)(a) for the same purpose. The Court reasoned that the replication of earlier legislative provisions in the 2014 Act indicated an intention for them to retain their existing meaning and effect, and that the distinction between "rates" and "components" of remuneration remained significant. Consequently, increases in remuneration rates did not constitute a change in a component of remuneration for the purposes of a review under section 45(1)(a), rendering that section inapplicable. As section 45 did not apply, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the operation of section 5(15)(a).