The Queen v Rolfe (No 7)

The case of The Queen v Rolfe (No 7) dealt with the admissibility of tendency evidence under the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), section 97. The applicant, Rolfe, sought to exclude evidence of his past conduct which the Crown intended to use to establish a tendency towards a particular type of offending. The primary legal issue was whether the proposed tendency evidence had significant probative value in relation to the facts in issue. The court had to assess if the evidence supported the proof of the alleged tendency and if the tendency made more likely the elements of the offences charged. Furthermore, the court needed to determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudicial effect on the accused.

In addressing the legal issues, the court referred to the High Court's decision in Hughes v The Queen, where the majority outlined the criteria for determining significant probative value. The court noted that evidence would have significant probative value if it strongly supported the proof of the tendency and if the tendency made more likely the elements of the offence charged. The court also highlighted the necessity of a comparison between the proposed tendency evidence and the facts in issue to assess the probative value. In this case, the applicant argued that the Crown’s estimate of the trial duration was overly optimistic and that the evidence would likely extend the trial considerably. The court evaluated whether the evidence met the threshold of significant probative value as required by section 97 of the ENULA.

Upon considering the arguments and the relevant legal principles, the court found that the proposed tendency evidence did not meet the threshold for significant probative value. The court concluded that the evidence did not strongly support the proof of the tendency, nor did the tendency make more likely the elements of the offences charged. Therefore, the evidence was deemed inadmissible under section 97 of the ENULA. The court’s decision hinged on the application of the legal criteria set out in Hughes, focusing on the strength of the evidence in supporting the tendency and its relevance to the facts in issue.

The final orders of the court were that the proposed tendency evidence was inadmissible as it did not possess significant probative value. This decision underscored the stringent requirements for admitting tendency evidence and the importance of the comparative analysis between the proposed evidence and the elements of the offence. The court’s reasoning emphasised the need for a high standard of probative value to justify the admission of such evidence.