The Commonwealth v Hazeldell Ltd

The Commonwealth appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning compensation for land acquired under the Lands Acquisition Act 1906. The dispute arose from a claim for compensation by Hazeldell Ltd. for land containing limestone deposits, which the Commonwealth had acquired. The core of the disagreement centred on whether the limestone was a reserved mineral belonging to the Crown, thereby affecting the compensation payable to Hazeldell Ltd.

The legal issues before the High Court were twofold: first, the proper interpretation of the reservation of "all minerals" in a Crown grant issued in 1886, particularly in light of subsequent legislation defining "minerals"; and second, the application of section 46(2) of the Mining Act 1906 (NSW) to determine whether the land was open to public mining for limestone, thereby impacting the compensation entitlement. The court was required to ascertain the legal effect of the reservation in the Crown grant and the scope of the Mining Act 1906 in relation to private land and declared minerals.

Griffith C.J. and Rich J., in their joint judgment, held that a Crown grant issued after the commencement of the Crown Lands Act 1884, but pursuant to a conditional sale under the earlier Crown Lands Alienation Act 1861, should be construed according to the provisions of the 1884 Act when determining rights between private parties. They reasoned that the reservation of "all minerals" in such a grant should be interpreted in accordance with the definition of "minerals" provided by the relevant legislation at the time of the grant's construction. Furthermore, they interpreted the term "reservation" in section 46(2) of the Mining Act 1906 to mean a clause that legally effected a reservation at the date of the Crown grant. Consequently, they concluded that the reservation in the 1886 grant did not legally reserve limestone, as it was not considered a mineral under the applicable legislation at that time. The court also considered the meaning of "minerals" in both instances within section 46(2) to refer to the same substances, and that a Proclamation declaring limestone a mineral under the Mining Act 1906 did not retroactively alter the meaning of the reservation in the 1886 grant.

The appeal was dismissed, with Griffith C.J. and Rich J. affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. They held that Hazeldell Ltd. was entitled to compensation for the value of the limestone, as it was not effectively reserved to the Crown by the 1886 grant and was therefore considered part of the land acquired by the Commonwealth. Gavan Duffy J. dissented, finding that the Crown grant should be construed under the 1861 Act and that limestone was a mineral within the ordinary signification of the word, thus falling under the reservation and the provisions of the Mining Act 1906.