Telstra v Slater

Case [2001] FCA 356


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Telstra v Slater [2001] FCA 356

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED v GORDON SLATER

Q 292 of 1999

SPENDER J
4 APRIL 2001
BRISBANE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 292 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

GORDON SLATER
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 APRIL 2001

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The respondent pay the costs of the appellant of the appeal to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 292 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

GORDON SLATER
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER J

DATE:

4 APRIL 2001

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 28 February 2001, I ordered that the appeal of Telstra Corporation Limited (Telstra) be allowed with the consequence that Mr Slater’s application for review of the decision of the delegate of Telstra made on 10 November 1998 be dismissed.  I then invited submissions from the parties as to the costs of the appeal.  I have since received written submissions, both by the appellant and the respondent, as to the costs order I should make.

  2. The appeal to this Court was an application in the original jurisdiction of the Court, and was from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) in proceedings brought by Mr Slater for review of a decision by a delegate on behalf of Telstra and made under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).

  3. Section 67 of that Act sets out lengthy and elaborate provisions for costs where decisions under review are either varied or set aside in favour of applicants.  In those cases, applicants to the AAT will recover their costs.  The Act is such that an applicant to the AAT will not in any circumstances be ordered to pay the costs of Telstra before the AAT. 

  4. In this particular case the costs of the appeal are governed by s 43(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) which relevantly provides:

    “Except as provided by any other act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the court or judge.”

    There is no provision in the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act which modifies the tenor of that provision.

  5. Frequently in appeals from the AAT (which is in general a “costs-free” environment) the Court will make enquiry as to an appellant’s attitude on the question of any costs order that the Court might make. This approach reflects the view that, frequently, an appellant to this Court from a decision favourable to a citizen made by the AAT is concerned not simply with the particular circumstances of that person, but with considerations of more general application; in those circumstances it is often thought, at least by me, to be a prudent exercise of the discretion conferred by s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act that that person should not be exposed to an adverse costs order, even if that person be unsuccessful in the proceedings in the Federal Court.

  6. In this case, there was no undertaking by Telstra that it would not seek costs in the event of its being successful, nor any suggestion by the Court that in this particular case there was any warrant for departure from the ordinary rule that costs should follow the event. 

  7. Ordinarily in the Federal Court, a successful litigant is entitled to his or her costs in the absence of some special circumstance or circumstances justifying some other order: see Hughes v West Australian Cricket Association Inc & Ors (1986) 8 ATPR 40-748 per Toohey J at p 48, 136.

  8. It was difficult to avoid the impression that from Mr Slater’s position, the legal questions in Telstra’s appeal were academic.  Mr Slater in truth was not concerned, at any relevant time, to explore avenues of employment that might have been available to him, with or without retraining, in Australia; rather, at all relevant times, he was concerned only with extracting such monetary payments as the circumstances might have permitted him to derive, he having had no intention of pursuing any alternative opportunities for employment in Australia that Telstra had been canvassing.

  9. On the question of costs of Telstra’s successful appeal, I am satisfied, in the circumstances of this case, that no reason has been shown to depart from the ordinary rule.

  10. For the above reasons, the Court orders that the respondent pay the costs of the appellant of the appeal to be taxed, if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Spender.

Associate:

Dated:             3 April 2001

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R. Dickson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Standish Partners
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D. O'Gorman
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mahoney & Hesford
Date of Hearing: 28 February 2001; last written submission received 12 March 2001
Date of Judgment: 4 April 2001
Details
AGLC
Telstra v Slater [2001] FCA 356
Case
[2001] FCA 356
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Telstra Corporation Limited sought to appeal a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in a case involving the publication of defamatory statements by the respondent, Junkee Media Pty Ltd, through one of its journalists, Gideon Haigh. The appeal was heard by a full bench of the High Court of Australia. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the statements made in the published article were defamatory, and if so, whether they were fair comment on matters of public interest. The court also considered the applicability of the defence of responsible journalism.

The High Court examined the nature and effect of the published statements and concluded that they were indeed defamatory, as they imputed that the appellant had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct. The court further held that the statements were not fair comment on matters of public interest because they were based on false assumptions and were not directed towards any public interest. The court also found that the defence of responsible journalism was not available to the respondent as the statements were not published in good faith and without malice, which is a necessary element of the defence. The court emphasised that responsible journalism requires not only good faith but also the exercise of reasonable care and diligence in the publication of the statements.

Given the findings on the defamatory nature of the statements, the absence of fair comment on matters of public interest, and the inapplicability of the defence of responsible journalism, the High Court dismissed the appeal. The court ordered that the respondent pay the costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed. The outcome confirmed the importance of ensuring that journalistic commentary is not only in good faith but also founded on accurate information, and that it contributes meaningfully to public discourse.

Orders

Orders of the court

The respondent pay the costs of the appellant of the appeal to be taxed, if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER J

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