Sutton v Hunter

Sutton v Hunter involved the appellant, Kate Ann Sutton, who claimed damages for personal injury and other losses resulting from a car accident. The respondent, Lauren Nicole Hunter, admitted liability for the injuries but disputed the quantum of damages. The Supreme Court of Queensland was tasked with determining the correctness of the primary judge's assessment of both past and future economic losses, as well as the appropriateness of the costs order made by the primary judge.

The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge erred in his assessment of past economic loss by determining the amount the appellant would likely have earned had she not been injured. Another issue was whether the primary judge's assessment of future economic loss was erroneous, given the appellant's loss of earning capacity as a result of the injury. The court also needed to decide if the primary judge’s findings relating to statutory construction and the awarding of global sums were consistent with the law and whether the reduction of the economic loss award by 15% was arbitrary and against the weight of the evidence.

The court found that the primary judge's assessment of past economic loss was incorrect as the rates used in the Vincents report already included superannuation, making an additional claim for superannuation redundant. Regarding future economic loss, the court observed that the appellant's claim theory was inconsistent with the pleaded material facts, as it was only a possibility that she would be precluded from returning to remunerative employment after the "short to mid-term". The court further found that the primary judge's reduction of the economic loss award by 15% was inconsistent with the proper application of s 55 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), arbitrary, and against the weight of the evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, varied the past economic loss award to $543,988, and modified the costs order to be assessed on the indemnity basis. Additionally, the second respondent was required to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, assessed on the standard basis.