Sullivan and Tyler (No 2)

In *Sullivan & Tyler (No 2)*, the Family Court of Australia considered an application by the mother, Ms Sullivan, seeking increased communication with her child, D, including telephone, email, and letter contact. The father, Mr Tyler, sought dismissal of the mother's application and, alternatively, that any further interim applications by the mother be adjourned to the final hearing. The father also sought an injunction to restrain the mother from instituting further interim parenting proceedings without leave, arguing that such proceedings were vexatious.

The court was required to determine whether there had been a demonstrated change in circumstances since previous orders were made by Loughnan J regarding telephone communication, which would warrant varying those orders in the child's best interests. Additionally, the court had to consider the father's application to restrain the mother from initiating further interim proceedings, pursuant to section 118 of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) or rule 11.04(1) of the *Family Law Rules 2004* (Cth), on the grounds that such proceedings were vexatious.

Watts J applied the principles from *Rice & Asplund* and *Ruddock & Robins*, holding that new or repeated interim applications should not be entertained without a significant change in circumstances. The mother's asserted changes in circumstances, relating to the child's mental health and alleged failures by the father to facilitate communication, were not sufficiently established by independent evidence on an interim basis. The court found that the existing telephone communication order remained in the child's best interests. Regarding the father's application, the court found that the mother's repeated interim applications, particularly in light of her failure to raise certain issues in prior hearings, demonstrated a pattern of vexatious litigation, justifying the imposition of an injunction.

Consequently, the mother's application for increased communication was dismissed. The court ordered that the mother be restrained from instituting any further interim proceedings for parenting or other orders in relation to the child D without leave of the Family Court of Australia. Furthermore, the mother was restrained from serving any application for leave to institute further proceedings upon the father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer without court permission. A judge, initially Justice Watts, was appointed to manage any future applications concerning the child D, particularly those seeking leave from the mother.