Stuart-Robertson v Lloyd

The case of *Stuart-Robertson v Lloyd* concerned an appeal from the Court of Bankruptcy regarding the sequestration of the estate of Robert James Stuart-Robertson, a member of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales. The Official Receiver sought an order under section 101 of the *Bankruptcy Act 1924-1930* (Cth) to appropriate a portion of the bankrupt's parliamentary allowance for the benefit of his creditors. The Court of Bankruptcy had made an order directing the bankrupt to contribute £4 per week from his allowance, which was granted under section 28 of the *Constitution Act 1902* (N.S.W.) as reimbursement for expenses. The bankrupt appealed this decision to the High Court.

The central legal issues before the High Court were: first, whether the parliamentary allowance received by a member of a State Parliament constituted "pay, pension, salary, emoluments, profits, wages, earnings, or income" within the meaning of section 101 of the *Bankruptcy Act*; second, whether the allowance was excluded from the operation of section 101 by its proviso, which exempts payments made exempt from attachment or incapable of assignment or charge by any Act or State Act; and third, whether section 101 of the *Bankruptcy Act*, as applied to State parliamentary allowances, was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth Parliament's legislative power.

A majority of the High Court held that the parliamentary allowance was "income" within the meaning of section 101 of the *Bankruptcy Act*. While acknowledging the allowance was described as reimbursement for expenses, the Court found that it formed part of the member's general resources and could be applied as he saw fit, thus falling within the broad definition of income. The Court also determined that the proviso to section 101 did not exclude the allowance, as there was no specific State Act making it exempt from attachment or incapable of assignment, and the common law principles of public policy did not, in the Court's view, automatically render it unassignable in this context. Furthermore, the Court found that the Commonwealth Parliament had the constitutional power under section 51(XVII) of the *Constitution* to legislate with respect to bankruptcy, and that section 101 was a valid exercise of this power, not unduly interfering with State legislative functions. The Court concluded that the discretion conferred by section 101 had been exercised according to law by the Judge in Bankruptcy, and therefore the appeal should be dismissed.