STRONG & WELCH

This matter came before Judge Harman concerning parenting orders for two children, X and Y. The dispute involved allegations of abuse and concerns regarding the children's welfare, leading to applications for specific parenting arrangements.

The court was required to determine the appropriate parenting orders for X and Y, considering the evidence presented and the relevant provisions of the *Family Law Act 1975*. A significant issue before the court was the application and weight of evidence, particularly in light of section 69ZT of the *Family Law Act 1975*, which modifies the strict application of the *Evidence Act 1995* in child-related proceedings. The court also had to consider the admissibility and probative value of hearsay evidence and evidence presented by a self-represented litigant.

Judge Harman reasoned that while section 69ZT of the *Family Law Act 1975* allows for the admission of evidence that might otherwise be inadmissible under the *Evidence Act 1995*, the court retains discretion under sections 135 and 136 of the *Evidence Act 1995* to refuse or limit evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or undue waste of time. The court noted that due process must be afforded to all parties, regardless of their representation status, and that rules of evidence apply equally. Applying these principles, the court indicated that little weight would be attached to material that did not comply with the modified rules of evidence. The court also considered the standard of proof required for findings of "unacceptable risk," determining it to be the civil standard on the balance of probabilities, applied at its highest level due to the gravity of the allegations.

The court made several orders, including granting leave for inspection of subpoenaed material. Crucially, all prior parenting orders were discharged. The court ordered that each parent would have parental responsibility for the children when they were in their respective care. Pending further orders, the children were to live with their mother, and specific arrangements were made for the children to spend time with and communicate with their father, including during school terms and holidays. Further orders addressed the practicalities of the children passing between parents, daily telephone contact, the exchange of essential information regarding the children's schooling and health, and a prohibition on discussing the proceedings with the children. Additionally, by consent, the mother was ordered to ensure her former partner, Mr C, had no contact with the children.