Storch v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General

Jamie Luke Storch sought to overturn a decision by the Director-General of the Department of Justice and Attorney-General that his case was "exceptional" within the meaning of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld). The Director-General had issued a negative notice to Mr Storch after he was charged with a disqualifying offence under the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). The charge was dismissed by a jury, but Mr Storch was issued a negative notice due to other complaints against him that had not resulted in charges. Mr Storch claimed that the issuance of the negative notice and the decision that his case was "exceptional" limited his human rights.

The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the Working with Children Act provided a detailed guide and checklist for determining whether a particular case was "exceptional", and whether the mandatory considerations set out in the Act were relevant to the case. The court also had to consider whether the charge against Mr Storch, which had been dismissed by a jury, was still considered a charge under the Working with Children Act.

The court found that the Working with Children Act provided a detailed guide and checklist for determining whether a case was "exceptional", and that the mandatory considerations set out in the Act were relevant to the case. The court also found that a charge, even if dismissed by a jury, was still considered a charge under the Working with Children Act. The court confirmed the decision of the Director-General that Mr Storch's case was "exceptional" and that the issuance of the negative notice was reasonable and justified under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).

The court's decision was based on its specific findings about Mr Storch's rights under the Working with Children Act and the QCAT Act, as well as the actions and decisions of the Tribunal. The court found that any limits imposed by the Tribunal's decisions and actions were reasonable and justified in accordance with s 13 of the Human Rights Act. The court also noted that the evidence presented to the Tribunal, as it related to each of the mandatory considerations set out in s 226(2)(a) of the Working with Children Act, supported the decision that Mr Storch's case was "exceptional".