Stone v Police

The applicant sought permission to appeal against convictions for breaching an intervention order made on 5 September 2012. The intervention order was made against the applicant, who was a neighbour of the protected person, due to a history of difficulties between them. The charges related to alleged incidents on 10 November 2016 and 2 December 2016, involving starting a vehicle early in the morning and speaking to the protected person. A third count was withdrawn, and the applicant was acquitted of a fourth count. The application was heard by Vanstone, Parker, and Lovell JJ of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The legal issues before the court included whether the trial Magistrate and the judge on appeal erred in their treatment of evidence of discreditable conduct led at the applicant's trial, specifically whether it constituted inadmissible propensity evidence or was properly admitted as background and context. The court also considered whether the judge correctly distinguished relevant High Court authority and a prior decision concerning the applicant. Further issues involved the evaluation of competing evidence, the prosecutor's cross-examination, and the Magistrate's handling of the fourth count. The central question was whether the applicant had demonstrated that his grounds of appeal were reasonably arguable and raised a question of principle or importance, thereby justifying a grant of permission to appeal.

The Full Court, in dismissing the application for permission to appeal, agreed with the analysis of the judge on appeal. The court found that the evidence of discreditable conduct was admissible for the purpose of establishing background and context, noting that no objection was taken at the time of its presentation. The court held that the judge correctly applied the principles from *Roach v The Queen* and distinguished the applicant's prior case, where the evidence involved criminal behaviour and was objected to. The court found the grounds relating to the evaluation of evidence to be unarguable and dismissed the suggestion of malice by the prosecutor. The court also agreed with the judge's treatment of the fourth count. Ultimately, the court concluded that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that his grounds of appeal met the threshold for a grant of permission to appeal.