Stamford Property Services Pty Ltd v Mulpha Australia Ltd

Stamford Property Services Pty Ltd (the appellant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Heritage Council of New South Wales (the Council) concerning the heritage listing of a building situated on land owned by the appellant. The dispute arose from the Council's interpretation of its powers under section 57(1)(e) of the *Heritage Act 1977* (NSW), which prohibits carrying out development in relation to land on which a listed building is situated without the Council's approval. The appellant wished to redevelop the portion of its land not occupied by the listed building, but the Council proceeded on the basis that its approval was only required for activities within the listed building itself. An adjoining landowner, as the first respondent, sought judicial review of the Council's decision, alleging the Council had misdirected itself.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the prohibition under section 57(1)(e) of the *Heritage Act 1977* (NSW) required a nexus between the proposed development and the heritage values of the listed building, and consequently, whether the prohibition applied to development on any part of the lot on which the listed building was situated, or only to the building itself and its immediate curtilage. The Court was required to consider the significance of the statutory text, its context, and its purpose in determining the scope of the Council's approval powers.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that the statutory language of section 57(1)(e) was clear and unambiguous. It held that the prohibition applied to development "in relation to the land on which the listed building was situated," which encompassed the entire lot, not merely the building or its immediate surroundings. The Court rejected the interpretation that a nexus to the heritage values of the building was a prerequisite for the prohibition to apply, finding that the purpose of the provision was to protect the heritage significance of the building by controlling development on the land it occupied. The Court concluded that the Council had erred in law by misinterpreting the scope of its statutory power.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The orders made by the primary judge were set aside, and the proceedings were dismissed with costs. The first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.