Soteriou v Police No. Scgrg-00-288

Soteriou appealed against her conviction and sentence of six months’ disqualification from holding a driver’s licence, following her guilty plea to driving while over the prescribed alcohol limit. The appeal was dismissed by the Magistrates Court. The appeal to the Supreme Court is out of time, but the respondent does not oppose an extension of time if there has been a miscarriage of justice. The appeal will be allowed and the conviction and sentence set aside. The appellant did not commit the offence to which she pleaded guilty. The appellant did not plead guilty out of a consciousness of guilt. The events which led to the plea of guilty must be considered. The appellant had told the police that she was the driver of the vehicle in which she was travelling. She had told this to the police to protect her friend, Fiona Shaw, who was the actual driver. The appellant was concerned about the fact that she did not tell the police the truth. She mentioned this to her sister who went to the police on the day of the accident to tell them the truth. When she was told the investigating officers were not there, her sister left and did not pursue her attempts to speak to the police. However, the appellant’s sister did ring the solicitor and tell him about the matter, including the fact that the appellant was not the driver of the vehicle. According to the appellant’s sister, the solicitor told her that if the appellant went back on her word she would be perjuring herself and she could be imprisoned. The appellant was not adequately advised. There was some confusion in her mind. I accept that the appellant left the solicitor’s office with the impression that the solicitor was telling her she had little option but to plead guilty and that she could not go back on what she had said to the police. I say “impression” because I am not prepared to find that this is how the solicitor put the matter to her. But in the light of his strong view that she was lying and his reticence to explain why he was advising her to think about the matter, I can understand how she formed this impression as to the effect of his advice. She said she felt she was left with no real choice in the matter and decided to change her instructions. In my view, the plea which was entered in these circumstances could not be regarded as being made freely and voluntarily with sufficient knowledge by the appellant to make an informed decision. The appellant is a young woman who had not been in trouble with the law before this incident. She did not commit the offence with which she was charged and it is clear that when she consulted the solicitor her instructions were to that effect. For reasons which appealed to the solicitor and which he did not wish to communicate to the appellant, he did not accept her version as being truthful. I am confident in finding that the solicitor did not intend to pressure the appellant in an improper manner into changing her instructions and that he considered that he was acting in her best interests. However, I have no doubt that she considered herself to be under pressure. It was in these circumstances that she admitted to an offence which she did not commit. In my view the exceptional circumstances of this case disclose a miscarriage of justice.