Skyring, Alan George v Telecom Australia

[1984] FCA 391

3q1

JUDGMENT No. ......,........ ... I .., .,....,.. -

IN THE FEDERAL COURT or AUSTRALIA	)
DUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY	)
GENERAL DIVISION	1 QLD G105 of 1984

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BETWEEN :

ALAN GEORGE SKYRING

Applicant

kND :

TELECOM AUSTRALIA

Respondent

O R D E R

JUDGE MAKING ORDER:	SPENDER J.
DATE OF ORDER:	18 OCTOBER 1984
WHERE MADE:	BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Application G105 of 1984 be refused.

2. Applicant pay Respondent's costs to be

taxed.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

OUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY 1

GENERAL DIVISION ) QLD G105 of 1984

N - B :

ALAN GEORGE SKYRING

Applicant

AND :

TELECOM AUSTRALIA

Respondent

SPENDER J. 18 OCTOBER 1984

EXTEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I assume for the purpose of this application that the

communication which is Exhibit "A" to Mr Skyring's affidavit,

filed 9 October 1984, which is a letter dated 26 September 1984,

(which is the date upon which this application was filed), and/or

the conduct by the person responsible for that letter constitutes

a decision to which the Administrative Decisions (Judicial

Review) Act 1977 ("the Act") applies.

I have listened to the confident submissions made by Mr

Skyring in relation to this matter, and shortly put, none of the grounds of his application are made out. It is not suggested by

him that there is anything biased or mala fide in the dealings by

the officers of Telecom Australia. Essentially, what he frankly

asserts to be the reason for these various applications is his

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desire to chall~nge the money system, essentially on the grounds

of claimed infringement of 5.115 of the Commonwealth

Constitution.

I refer to the judgment of McPherson J. in the

Queensland Supreme Court in relation to an income tax appeal t

between Mr Skyring and the Commissioner of Taxation (unreported

19 August 1983). I adopt expressly the observations which appear

at p.3 of his Honour's judgment -

l'... some reference was made to 3.115 of the

Constitution and to the undesirability of the

printing, issue and circulation of paper

money in which the taxpayer said he might

ultimately be obliged to pay the assessment

once this appeal failed, if it did. The

questlon whether or not it is desirable to

return to the gold standard, to cease issuing

paper money or to acknowledge any of the

varlous forms of credit, financing and

banking of the kind that were referred to in

argument before me is, of course, a matter

entirely for Parliament and not for this

Court. In this Court the matter of the law

governing discharge of bligations i

determined by the Currency Act 1965, 3.16 of

which prescribes what is legal tender in

Australia. That Act binds me. It is

certainly in no way affected by 5.115 of the

Constitution which creates simply a

prohlbition against the issuing of currency by State governments. Accordingly, no

problem will arise in relation to a tender by

the taxpayer of a sufficient number of notes

and coins constituting legal tender within

s.16 of the Currency Act for the purpose of

discharging his l ability under the

assessment which has issued. I am, of

course, not concerned in any event with the

means by which the assessment is to be

discharged but only with the question of

whether it was properly made. However, I

have mentioned the argument on the currency

question simply because it was one that was

raised before me. 'I

The Act binds me equally as it does McPherson J. It is

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certainly in no way affected by 3.115 of the Constitution, which

creates simply a prohibition against the issuing of currency by

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State governments.

In my view, the circumstances of s.78B notices under the

Judiciary Act 1903 do not apply here, and what has in fact

occurred is that the taxpayer, or another person, his wife, has

tendered a sufficient number of notes or coins constituting legal

tender within 5.16 of the Currency Act 1965 to enable the

telephone service not to be disconnected.

In this particular case, even assuming that a relevant !

decision ~7as made, no grounds exist upon which that decision can

properly be challenged under the Act in this Court.

The same broad complaint, however, was addressed by Mr

Skyring to the Full Court of the Federal Court in the appeal from

the judgment of McPherson J., and I have been referred to the

judgment of Sir Reginald Smithers in respect of that matter. Its

relevance to this present application is self-evident.

It appears from the affidavit of Mr Fitzsimon that the

telephone account in question has been paid. In truth the

submissions before me were directed to the raising of the

question of the currency system and the implications, if any, of

3.115 of the Constitution on that matter. For my own part, the

position I s as was indicated in the judgment of McPherson J., and

no reviewable error appears in respect of application number Qld

G105 of 1984.

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In the circumstances, I order that the application be

refused with costs to be taxed.

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