Skrijel v Mengler

Case [2003] VSC 59


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 5446 of 1993

MEHMED SKRIJEL Plaintiff
v
JOHN CARL MENGLER   Firstnamed Defendant
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Secondnamed Defendant
GARY WESTON COOK   Thirdnamed Defendant
STATE OF VICTORIA   Fourthnamed Defendant

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JUDGE:

NETTLE J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

4 March 2003

DATE OF RULING:

4 March 2003

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

Skrijel v Mengler and ors

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2003] VSC 59

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Evidence – Ombudsman’s Report – hearsay – not admissible as proof of the truth of its contents.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff In Person
For the Firstnamed Defendant Mr M. Tovey QC
with Mr P. Marzella
Hardham Dalton & Sunberg

For the Secondnamed Defendant

Mr B. Walters SC
with Mr K. Mueller

Australian Government Solicitors

For the Thirdnamed Defendant

Mr J. Santamaria QC
with Mr M. Gindberg

Victorian Government Solicitors

For the Fourthnamed Defendant

Mr R. Gipp

Ebsworth & Ebsworth

HIS HONOUR:

  1. The plaintiff seeks to tender into evidence a section of the report of the Deputy Ombudsman, Police Complaints, dated 21 February 1997, on the investigation of a complaint made by the Commonwealth Minister for Justice in connection with allegations made by the plaintiff that members of the Victoria Police fabricated evidence against him.

  1. The section sought to be tendered begins at the foot of p.138 of the document, corresponding with the foot of p.2419 of Volume 6 of the Court Book, headed "The fingerprint on the gun", and concludes at p.143 of the document, corresponding with p.2424 of Volume 6 of the Court Book, immediately before the sub-heading "7.2 Mr Skrijel's credibility generally".

  1. It is submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that what is said by the Ombudsman in this section of the report is admissible as evidence that, before the criminal prosecution which gives rise to this proceeding was commenced, four police fingerprint experts examined photographs of fingerprints said to have been taken from a Cooey rifle and none of them appears to have noticed that one of the photographs was a forgery.

  1. Objection is taken to the tender on the grounds that the evidence is hearsay and that it does not come within any of the established exceptions to the rule against hearsay. 

  1. In my opinion the objection is well founded.  So much of the contents of the section of the report as states that four experts identified the fingerprint on the fore-end of the rifle as being Mr Skrijel's, and that none of them noticed that the fingerprint was a forgery, is hearsay evidence of those facts.

  1. I do not consider that the section of the report comes within the business records exception under the Evidence Act 1958 or the common law public document exception to hearsay, or any other exception that is relevant.

  1. Consequently, I reject the tender.

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Details
AGLC
Skrijel v Mengler [2003] VSC 59
Case
[2003] VSC 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Skrijel v Mengler was a case heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, involving a dispute between the plaintiff, Skrijel, and the defendant, Mengler, regarding a matter of alleged professional misconduct. The plaintiff sought damages for professional negligence, and the defendant raised a defence based on an Ombudsman’s report which allegedly exonerated the defendant from any professional misconduct. The central issue before the court was whether the Ombudsman’s report could be admitted as evidence of the truth of its contents.

The court considered the admissibility of the Ombudsman’s report under the hearsay rule, which generally prohibits the introduction of out-of-court statements to prove the truth of their contents. The plaintiff argued that the report should be admitted as it was a public document and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The defendant, on the other hand, contended that the report was hearsay and should not be admitted as evidence of the truth of its contents. The court needed to determine whether the Ombudsman’s report could be admitted for any purpose other than to prove the truth of its contents, and if so, what that purpose might be.

The court held that the Ombudsman’s report was inadmissible as evidence of the truth of its contents. While the report was not strictly hearsay because it was a public document, the court found that it was hearsay nonetheless. The court further held that the report could not be admitted for any purpose other than to prove the truth of its contents. As such, the report was inadmissible in the proceedings. The court's reasoning was based on the principle that hearsay evidence is not admissible to prove the truth of its contents unless an exception applies, and no exception was found in this case.

No specific orders were made regarding the admissibility of the Ombudsman’s report, as the case was not determined on the merits of the claim for professional negligence. The case was remanded for further proceedings, pending the resolution of the admissibility issue.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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