Sklovsky and Gastin

In *Sklovsky and Gastin*, heard in the Family Court of Australia, Mr Sklovsky (the Father) sought to vary existing consent parenting orders made on 4 April 2006 concerning his son, born in April 2005. Ms Gastin (the Mother) applied for the Father's applications to be struck out, arguing that he had not established a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a reassessment of the parenting arrangements.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Father had demonstrated a material change in circumstances since the final consent orders were made, which would justify reopening the parenting arrangements. The court was required to consider the established legal principles governing the variation of parenting orders, particularly the rule in *Rice and Asplund*, which requires a significant change in circumstances or a new factor to be shown before settled orders will be disturbed, to protect children from the harm of prolonged litigation.

Justice O'Ryan applied the principles from *Rice and Asplund*, noting that the rule applies to consent orders and that the onus is on the applicant to adduce evidence of a change in circumstances. The Father relied on several grounds, including a lack of legal advice at the time of the consent orders, the Mother's relocation leading to a loss of incidental contact, concerns about the Mother's association with an ex-partner, improvements in his own mental health following his father's death, and an improved employment and financial situation. The court found that none of these grounds met the threshold for a material change in circumstances. Specifically, the court found that the Father's lack of legal advice was irrelevant given his prior legal representation and the extensive history of proceedings, and that his awareness of the consequences of the consent orders. The loss of incidental contact was dismissed as the Father was subject to an Apprehended Violence Order, and the concerns about the Mother's association with her ex-partner had been raised and considered prior to the consent orders being made. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the claims regarding the Father's improved mental health and financial situation as constituting a material change.

Consequently, the court dismissed all of the Father's applications for parenting orders.