Shields v New South Wales Crime Commission

In *Shields v New South Wales Crime Commission*, the claimants, including Shields, appealed a restraining order made by the New South Wales Crime Commission under section 10 of the *Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990* (NSW). The restraining order targeted property held by the claimants, which the Commission suspected was derived from serious crime related activity by one Ollis. The dispute centred on whether the property was indeed serious crime derived property and whether the restraining orders were sufficiently specific.

The court was required to determine three primary legal issues. Firstly, whether there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the property in question was derived from serious crime related activity, specifically concerning Ollis's actions involving an automatic banking malfunction and subsequent withdrawals. Secondly, whether it was necessary for the Commission to prove that the property had not ceased to be serious crime derived property in the hands of the claimants. Finally, the court had to consider whether the restraining orders issued were sufficiently specific in identifying the property or class of interests in property to be restrained, as required by the Act.

The Court of Appeal, with Beazley JA delivering the leading judgment, held that the evidence established reasonable grounds to suspect Ollis engaged in serious crime related activity. His knowledge of the banking system's conditions and his deliberate exploitation of a glitch to withdraw funds satisfied the elements of larceny, thus constituting serious crime derived property. The court further clarified that for the purposes of section 10, the Commission was not required to prove that the property had ceased to be serious crime derived property in the hands of third parties. Sufficient evidence existed to support the suspicion that the claimants' property was indeed serious crime derived property. Regarding the specificity of the orders, the court determined that the orders restraining a "specified class of interests" were to be interpreted within the context and overall purpose of the *Criminal Assets Recovery Act*.

The appeal was dismissed. The court extended the time for the claimants to file their summons for leave to appeal, granted leave to appeal, and ordered the claimants to pay the respondent's costs of the summons for leave to appeal and the appeal.