Sargent v South East Queensland Electricity Board

[2000] QCA 65

[SARGENT v SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND ELECTRICITY BOARD & Anor]
  [2000] QCA 65
COURT OF APPEAL

DAVIES JA
McPHERSON JA
PINCUS JA

Appeal Nos 3384 of 1999
          3384 of 1999C

JOHN G SARGENT  Appellant

and

SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND ELECTRICITY BOARD          Respondent

and

POWERLINK  Respondent

and

THE MINISTER FOR DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES  Respondent

BRISBANE

..DATE 10/03/2000

JUDGMENT

DAVIES JA:  There are two matters before this Court.  The first is a notice of appeal from judgments of the Chief Justice given on 19 March and 7 April 1999.  The respondents to that notice are named as South East Queensland Electricity Board, Powerlink and the Minister for the Department of Natural Resources.

Only the first two of these, however, were parties to the judgments the subject of the notice.  This is what has given rise to the other matter before this Court, which is an application by the appellant in the first matter,
Mr Sargent, for certain orders against the Minister for the Department of Natural Resources.

The first of these matters has a long history. In October 1996 the appellant lodged a claim for compensation in the Land Court purporting to be a claim for compensation under the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 against South East Queensland Electricity Board and Powerlink.

That claim was struck out by the Land Court on 5 December 1996 for want of jurisdiction.  Mr Sargent, who has appeared for himself throughout this litigation, submitted to this Court today that it was the application which resulted in striking out, which is the source of his problems.  Indeed it is the order which was made which is the source of his problems.

A costs order was also made against the appellant when that claim was struck out.  The appellant then appealed to the Land Appeal Court, which dismissed his appeal on 1 August 1997 and again ordered him to pay costs.

He appealed against that decision to this Court and on 26 May 1998 this Court dismissed the appeal and again ordered him to pay costs.  He then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, which was refused on 20 November 1998 and again he was ordered to pay costs.

What has happened subsequently is, as the appellant before this Court agrees, an attempt by him to revive the claim which he sought to make in the Land Court for compensation under the Acquisition of Land Act, notwithstanding the fact that various Tribunals, including this Court, had held that it failed for want of jurisdiction.

On 15 December 1998 the appellant filed an application purporting to be for a statutory order of review of a judgment of this Court and for his claim to be referred back to the Land Court for hearing determination.  That application was dismissed on 19 January 1999 and the appellant was again ordered to pay costs.

He filed a further application, in substance seeking the same relief, on 12 February 1999.  This was, in turn, dismissed with costs on 23 February 1999.  Again in March 1999 the appellant filed a further application seeking the same relief, which was again dismissed on 11 March 1999.

He filed, yet again, a further application for the same relief on 13 March 1999 and on 19 March 1999 it was dismissed by the Chief Justice.  This is the first of the orders, the subject of the notice of appeal.  On that date costs were reserved.

On 7 April 1999 the Chief Justice ordered the appellant to pay the respondents' costs on a solicitor and own client basis.  This order is the second one, the subject of the appellant's notice of appeal.

In summary, there appear to be at least four occasions on which the appellant has sought, since his application for special leave to the High Court was dismissed, to have this matter re-litigated by applications purporting to be applications under the Judicial Review Act.

A mere recitation of these facts in my view makes it abundantly clear that this appeal not only cannot succeed but is an abuse of process of the Court.

In any event it appears that as it is in effect an appeal from an order dismissing an application it can be brought to this Court only by leave of this Court: Judicial Review Act, sections 15(4) and 48(5).

The question which the appellant seeks to re-litigate was effectively determined against him finally when he was, on 20 November 1998, refused special leave to appeal to the High Court from the judgment of this Court on 26 May 1998.  He has nevertheless sought repeatedly to re-litigate this question.

Leave to appeal to this Court in respect of both orders should therefore be refused.  There is of course an additional difficulty in respect of the second, because it is sought to be an appeal against costs only.

The second matter before this Court arises out of the first, as I have already mentioned.  It is an application that various costs orders made in favour of the respondent, the Minister for the Department of Natural Resources be set aside, that that party be ordered to give security for costs and that it pay the costs of the application.

As I have already mentioned, the respondent the Minister for the Department of Natural Resources was named by the applicant as a respondent in the above appeals, although that respondent was not a party to either of the judgments from which the appeals were sought.

On 24 May the respondent sought an order from this Court that his name be removed from the record, and on 3 June 1999 this Court made such order and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs.  Then on 21 June 1999 the applicant sought an order from this Court that the order made on 3 June be dismissed and that the respondent pay his costs.  That application was dismissed by this Court on 27 July 1999 with costs.

On 23 August 1999 the Senior Deputy Registrar assessed those costs.  On 28 September 1999 the applicant sought reconsideration of the assessments, which was refused.

The application is to set aside those costs orders, for security for costs and for costs.  Again a mere recitation of the history of this matter shows that the applications are misconceived.  Apart from any other problems in appealing against costs orders, the orders which were made were plainly correct.  This application in my view must therefore also be dismissed.

McPHERSON JA: I agree. In so far as this is an appeal against costs, it is precluded by s.253 of the Supreme Court Act of 1995.  The application should be dismissed.

PINCUS JA:  I agree.

DAVIES JA:  The orders are as I have indicated.

...

DAVIES JA:  The Court orders in the first matter that the appellant pay the costs of the first and second respondents on an indemnity basis and in the second matter it orders that the applicant pay the respondent's costs also on an indemnity basis.

-----