Sankey v GPC Asia Pacific Pty Ltd

In Sankey v GPC Asia Pacific Pty Ltd, the applicant, Mr Sankey, sought a declaration that the period within which to commence an action for damages for negligence was extended to 22 March 2021. Mr Sankey had been employed by the defendant in December 2016 when he allegedly suffered a lower back injury and subsequently a psychiatric injury. Mr Sankey made an application for WorkCover benefits which was accepted and his claim was managed by WorkCover Queensland. After various surgeries and delays, Mr Sankey commenced common law court proceedings against the defendant in respect of the injuries sustained. The defendant claimed that Mr Sankey’s claim was time-barred. The court had to determine whether WorkCover provided Mr Sankey with a Notice of Assessment for his injury less than 6 months before the end of the general limitation period and whether Mr Sankey requested WorkCover to assess his injuries prior to the end of the general limitation period. The interpretation of the time limits imposed under Schedule 5 Section 1(a) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) was also at issue.

The court considered the relevant statutory provisions and found that the key question was whether Mr Sankey’s claim was time-barred by Schedule 5 Section 1(1)(b)(i) of the Act. The court held that the relevant time period was less than six months before the end of the general limitation period, which was 1 December 2019. The court found that WorkCover provided Mr Sankey with his Notice of Assessment on 16 September 2020, which was within the required time period. The court also found that Mr Sankey had requested WorkCover to assess his injuries prior to the end of the general limitation period. The court therefore declared that the period within which Mr Sankey was entitled to commence a proceeding claiming damages for personal injury was extended to 22 March 2021 and that the proceeding was not time-barred.

The court ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application on the standard basis and that the fees of both senior and junior counsel were to be regarded as necessary or proper for the attainment of justice. The court also granted each party liberty to apply.