Sanders and Sanders & Ors

In the matter of *Sanders and Sanders & Ors*, Rees J considered applications by both the husband and wife concerning the division of matrimonial property, following an appeal to the Full Court. The proceedings also involved third-party respondents against whom the wife sought equitable contribution orders. The core dispute revolved around the division of property under section 79 of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth), with significant procedural applications also before the court.

The court was required to determine whether it was just and equitable to make any order for property division, given that neither party possessed the capacity to satisfy such an order. Additionally, the court had to consider the wife's application for leave to amend her application during the re-hearing, assessing factors such as delay, wasted costs, prejudice, and case management. The wife also sought an adjournment under section 57 of the *Legal Aid Commission Act 1979* (NSW), requiring consideration of whether "special circumstances" existed. The court also had to address the wife's claims for equitable contribution against third-party respondents and the jurisdiction to make orders affecting their property, as well as various applications for costs, including indemnity costs.

Rees J dismissed the wife's application for leave to amend, finding that the substantial delay, wasted costs, and prejudice to other parties meant that an order for costs would not adequately compensate for the harm caused by further delay, and that the application should have been made earlier. The application for adjournment under section 57 of the *Legal Aid Commission Act 1979* (NSW) was also dismissed, as no special circumstances were established. Crucially, the court found that it was not just and equitable to make any property division orders under section 79 of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) because neither party had the capacity to satisfy such orders. The court also determined that it lacked jurisdiction to make orders affecting the property of the third-party respondents, as their property was not sufficiently connected to the division of the matrimonial property. All applications for costs were dismissed, including the wife's unsuccessful applications against the husband and respondents, and the husband's unsuccessful application against the wife, noting that while the wife's conduct might justify costs against her, she lacked the ability to satisfy such an order.

Consequently, the wife's applications for leave to amend, adjournment, spousal maintenance, property division orders, and costs were all dismissed. The husband's application for property division orders and his application for costs against the wife were also dismissed.