Saad & Ors v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police

This matter concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by Joseph Saad and others against the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police. The applicants contended that the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria had erred in its decision regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence in affidavits supporting applications for restraining orders under s 18 of the relevant legislation. The core of the applicants' argument was that the grounds for suspicion relied upon by an authorised officer must be based on admissible facts, and that hearsay evidence, even if informing the officer's suspicion, should not be admitted to prove the existence of those facts.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of s 18 of the relevant legislation and s 59 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth). Specifically, the applicants argued that the Court of Appeal incorrectly concluded that hearsay evidence was admissible to establish the grounds for an authorised officer's suspicion, even if that evidence was not admissible to prove the truth of the matters asserted. The applicants contended that the "reasonable grounds" for suspicion required by s 18 necessitated the adducing of admissible facts, and that the Court of Appeal's reasoning, which suggested that the truth of the hearsay was irrelevant to the formation of suspicion, was flawed.

The High Court, in refusing special leave to appeal, found that the application did not identify a question of principle. The Court stated that there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. This indicates that the High Court agreed with the lower appellate court's determination that the hearsay evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing the grounds for suspicion, without requiring proof of the underlying facts. The Court's refusal implies that the statutory framework, as interpreted by the Court of Appeal, did not necessitate the exclusion of such evidence in this context.

Special leave to appeal was refused with costs.