Ryan v Japin

In this case, the plaintiff, Michael Thomas Ryan, sought an extension of time under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 to bring his action against the first defendant, Isobel Japin, and the defendant by election, FAI General Insurance Company Limited. The plaintiff had been injured in a motor vehicle accident on 28 January 1993, which resulted in neck pain. However, the plaintiff had previously suffered a neck injury in a football accident in 1985. The plaintiff's primary contention was that the motor vehicle accident caused a new injury to his neck, which exacerbated the disability caused by the 1985 injury. The defendants opposed the plaintiff's application for an extension of time on the basis that the plaintiff had not acted reasonably in refraining from instituting proceedings until after he received fresh specialist advice.

The court considered whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably in refraining from instituting his proceedings until he received advice from Dr Day, an orthopaedic specialist, who concluded that the plaintiff had suffered a prolapse of the C6-7 disc as the result of the physical impact he received in the 1993 motor vehicle accident. The court held that it was reasonable for the plaintiff not to sue without the advice of Dr Day and reasonable for him to sue upon receipt of that advice. The court concluded that the plaintiff had established the facts necessary to justify the granting of his application for an extension of time. The court ordered that the costs of the application be reserved.

The legal issues in this case were whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably in refraining from instituting his proceedings until after he received fresh specialist advice and whether the plaintiff had a material fact of a decisive character relating to his right of action that was not within his means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of the last year preceding the expiration of the limitation period. The court held that the plaintiff had acted reasonably in refraining from instituting his proceedings until he received fresh specialist advice and that the plaintiff had a material fact of a decisive character relating to his right of action that was not within his means of knowledge until after 28 January 1994. The court granted the plaintiff's application for an extension of time to bring his action.