Rowe v Electoral Commissioner

The case of *Rowe v Electoral Commissioner* concerned a challenge to amendments made to the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (Cth) by the *Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006* (Cth). The plaintiffs sought a declaration that specific items within the amending Act were invalid and of no effect. The dispute centred on whether these amendments, which significantly altered the timeframe for enrolment and transfer of enrolment claims before an election, contravened constitutional requirements for the direct election of representatives.

The High Court was required to determine whether the amendments, by precluding claims for enrolment received after the issue of writs and claims for transfer of enrolment received shortly thereafter, operated as a disqualification from voting. If a disqualification was found, the Court had to consider whether it was for a substantial reason, particularly in light of the constitutional mandate that members of the House of Representatives be "directly chosen by the people" under sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution. The Court also considered whether the legislative power of the Commonwealth extended to enacting such amendments.

The Court reasoned that the amendments effectively removed a long-standing grace period for enrolment and significantly abridged the period for transfers of enrolment, thereby disentitling otherwise qualified persons from voting. This disentitlement was found to be a disqualification that was not for a substantial reason, and thus contrary to the constitutional requirement for representatives to be "directly chosen by the people". The Court applied the principles established in *Roach v Electoral Commissioner* concerning the constitutional limitations on the Parliament's power to regulate the franchise.

The Court declared that the impugned provisions of the *Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006* were invalid. The second defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs, and so much of the plaintiffs' application as remained after a prior order was dismissed.