Room v Baird

This case concerned an appeal from the Supreme Court of Tasmania regarding the construction of a will. The testatrix, Christina Room, bequeathed a sum of money to trustees to pay the income to her husband for life, and thereafter to her five children for their respective lives. Each child also possessed a power to appoint the capital of their share by deed or will. Three of the children, who were adults, sought to exercise this power by appointing their shares to themselves, arguing they would then be absolutely entitled to their shares, subject only to their father's life interest.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the question of the children's entitlement to their shares upon appointing them to themselves was res judicata. This arose because a previous originating summons, taken out by the trustees and to which the three sons were parties, had resulted in an order declaring that the children took life interests with a power of appointment, with their respective shares to remain in the hands of the trustees during their lives. The appellants contended that this prior order did not have the effect of res judicata, arguing that decisions on originating summonses were not binding judgments inter partes.

The High Court, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court, held that the matter was indeed res judicata. The Court reasoned that a decision on a question of construction arising from an originating summons, when the parties are before the court and the matter is argued, stands on the same footing as any other court decision. Although the specific question of appointing shares to oneself was not explicitly posed in the first summons, the order made by McIntyre J. had, in substance, determined that such appointments would not take effect in possession until after the death of the appointors. This prior determination, having been made between the same parties and not appealed, precluded the court from re-opening the question.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.