Romano and June (No 3)

The Family Court of Australia, in the matter of *Romano & June (No. 3)*, considered several interim applications made by the husband and wife in complex property division proceedings. The applications concerned the adducing of evidence by electronic communication, the admission of expert valuation evidence from non-single expert witnesses, and a significant application by the husband to restrain the wife's solicitor and their firm from continuing to represent the wife. The proceedings were characterised by high conflict between the parties, which had also manifested in the conduct of their legal representatives.

The court was required to determine whether to grant leave for certain witnesses to give evidence via audiovisual communication from London and Perth, and for other witnesses to give evidence via telephone from New Zealand, as opposed to attending in person. It also had to decide whether to permit both parties to adduce expert valuation evidence from multiple expert witnesses who were not acting as single joint experts. A central issue was the husband's application to disqualify the wife's solicitor, based on allegations of a conflict of interest arising from the solicitor's personal and financial involvement in funding the wife's legal fees through a personal loan facility.

In relation to the electronic communication of evidence, the court applied Family Law Rules 2004 r 16.05 and sections 7 and 8 of the *Foreign Evidence Act 1994*, granting leave for specified witnesses to give evidence remotely, with costs to be borne initially by the party seeking the remote attendance. Regarding expert evidence, the court applied r 15.51 of the Family Law Rules 2004, granting leave for both parties to adduce evidence from multiple expert witnesses on the valuation of chattels. On the application to restrain the wife's solicitor, the court applied its inherent jurisdiction, referencing *Naczek & Dowler* (2011) FamCAFC 179, and the test of whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires the practitioner to be prevented from acting. The court considered the exceptional nature of this jurisdiction, the public interest in a litigant not being deprived of their chosen lawyer without due cause, and the timing of the application.

The court was not satisfied that the husband had met the threshold for restraining the wife's solicitor. While acknowledging the solicitor's personal financial involvement in securing a loan facility to fund the wife's legal costs, the court found that the evidence did not demonstrate a conflict between the solicitor's duty to the court and his own interests that would imperil the independent administration of justice. Consequently, the application to restrain the solicitor was dismissed. The court made orders granting leave for various witnesses to give evidence remotely, allowing the adduction of expert valuation evidence from multiple experts for both parties, and requiring further disclosure from the husband. All other outstanding interim applications were dismissed.