Rolfe v Willis

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had dismissed an appeal from a summary conviction. The appellant, George Rolfe, was the licensee of licensed premises and had been charged with permitting drunkenness to occur on his premises, contrary to section 46 of the Liquor Act 1912 (N.S.W.). The charge arose from the discovery of a woman in a state of helpless drunkenness in a stable on the licensed premises.

The legal issues before the court concerned the interpretation of section 46 of the Liquor Act 1912. Specifically, the court had to determine what constituted "reasonable steps to prevent drunkenness" within the meaning of the Act, and whether the failure to prevent a drunken person from entering the premises or to eject them within a reasonable time amounted to a failure to take such reasonable steps. The Act placed the onus on the licensee to prove that they and their employees had taken all reasonable steps to prevent drunkenness once it was proven that a person was drunk on the premises.

The High Court held that "reasonable steps to prevent drunkenness" encompassed precautions taken against the occurrence of drunkenness under foreseeable circumstances and measures to prevent its continuation once discovered. The Court further clarified that failing to prevent a drunken person from entering the premises, or failing to eject them within a reasonable time, constituted a failure to take reasonable steps, unless such failure was justified by obligations of humanity or other legally recognised obligations. The Court emphasised that the question of what constituted a reasonable time for ejection was a question of fact dependent on the specific circumstances.

Ultimately, the High Court found that the central question of whether the appellant had taken all reasonable steps was a matter of fact, not law. As it was not the Court's practice to grant special leave to appeal when a Magistrate's factual determination was being challenged via statutory prohibition, the special leave to appeal was rescinded.