ROBINSON and CITY OF JOONDALUP

[2015] WASAT 114

ROBINSON and CITY OF JOONDALUP [2015] WASAT 114

Jurisdiction:	STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL	Citation No:	[2015] WASAT 114
Act:	DOG ACT 1976 (WA)
Case No:	CC:1194/2015	Heard:	25 SEPTEMBER 2015
Coram:	MR P DE VILLIERS (MEMBER)	Delivered:	13/10/15
No of pages:	15	Judgment Part:	1 of 1
Result:	Respondent's decision affirmed
Category:	B
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Parties:	WAYNE STEWART ROBINSON CITY OF JOONDALUP
Catchwords:	Dog Act 1976 (WA) ­ Application for review of decision declaring dog dangerous ­ Whether dog engaged in attacks ­ Turns on own facts
Legislation:	Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 3, s 32(4), s 33D(2A), s 33E, s 33F(1), s 33F(6), s 33GA
Case References:	Gillam and City of Fremantle [2010] WASAT 141 Ioppolo and City of Wanneroo [2013] WASAT 172
Orders	On the application heard on 25 September 2015 by Member Patric De Villiers, it is on 13 October 2015 ordered that:,1. The application for review of the City of Joondalup notice of 24 July2015 is dismissed.,2. 'Sheridan' remains a dangerous dog (declared) and must be kept in accordance with the requirements of keeping a dangerous dog under the Dog Act 1976 (WA), as set out in the City of Joondalup's notice of 24 July 2015.
Summary	In July of 2015, the City of Joondalup issued a Dangerous Dog Declaration to Mr Wayne Robinson in respect of his dog 'Sheridan'. A subsequent review of that declaration sought by Mr Robinson was refused by the City of Joondalup and he made application to the Tribunal seeking a review of the decision.,At issue were six incidents involving the dog which occurred between early January and late July in 2015.,Contested evidence in regard to two of the incidents meant it was not open to the Tribunal to definitively find that these incidents constituted an 'attack' under the provisions of the Dog Act 1976 (WA). However, in regard to the four other incidents, the Tribunal found they did constitute 'attacks' in terms of the definition established in s 3 of the Dog Act 1976 and that, in addition, the dog had shown a repeated tendency to attack, chase or threaten to attack.,In this context the Tribunal therefore found Sheridan could legitimately be considered for the issue of a notice declaring her a dangerous dog, that the respondent's decision to declare Sheridan to be a 'dangerous' dog pursuant to s 33E(1)(a) of the Dog Act 1976 was the correct and preferable decision, and for these reasons the application for review was dismissed and the decision of the respondent was affirmed.

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : DOG ACT 1976 (WA) CITATION : ROBINSON and CITY OF JOONDALUP [2015] WASAT 114 MEMBER : MR P DE VILLIERS (MEMBER) HEARD : 25 SEPTEMBER 2015 DELIVERED : 13 OCTOBER 2015 FILE NO/S : CC 1194 of 2015 BETWEEN : WAYNE STEWART ROBINSON

Applicant

AND

CITY OF JOONDALUP
Respondent

Catchwords:

Dog Act 1976 (WA) ­ Application for review of decision declaring dog dangerous ­ Whether dog engaged in attacks ­ Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 3, s 32(4), s 33D(2A), s 33E, s 33F(1), s 33F(6), s 33GA

Result:

Respondent's decision affirmed

Summary of Tribunal's decision:

In July of 2015, the City of Joondalup issued a Dangerous Dog Declaration to Mr Wayne Robinson in respect of his dog 'Sheridan'. A subsequent review of that declaration sought by Mr Robinson was refused by the City of Joondalup and he made application to the Tribunal seeking a review of the decision.

At issue were six incidents involving the dog which occurred between early January and late July in 2015.
Contested evidence in regard to two of the incidents meant it was not open to the Tribunal to definitively find that these incidents constituted an 'attack' under the provisions of the Dog Act 1976 (WA). However, in regard to the four other incidents, the Tribunal found they did constitute 'attacks' in terms of the definition established in s 3 of the Dog Act 1976 and that, in addition, the dog had shown a repeated tendency to attack, chase or threaten to attack.
In this context the Tribunal therefore found Sheridan could legitimately be considered for the issue of a notice declaring her a dangerous dog, that the respondent's decision to declare Sheridan to be a 'dangerous' dog pursuant to s 33E(1)(a) of the Dog Act 1976 was the correct and preferable decision, and for these reasons the application for review was dismissed and the decision of the respondent was affirmed.

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : In Person
Respondent : Mr T Beckett

Solicitors:

Applicant : N/A
Respondent : McLeods

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Gillam and City of Fremantle [2010] WASAT 141
Ioppolo and City of Wanneroo [2013] WASAT 172

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

1 On 24 July 2015, the City of Joondalup (City, Council, respondent), under the provisions of s 33E of the Dog Act 1976 (WA) (Dog Act), issued a Dangerous Dog Declaration to Mr Wayne Robinson in respect of his dog 'Sheridan'.

2 The First Schedule to that declaration read as follows:

On Saturday 10^th June 2015 at approximately 5.17pm at Barridale Park, Kingsley the dog in question Sheridan rushed a lady with two children aggressively barking and circling [them] and frightening them.

3 Mr Robinson subsequently sought a review of the respondent's decision under s 33F(6) of the Dog Act. The respondent duly considered this objection and by correspondence dated 31 July 2015, advised Mr Robinson that in the circumstances of the case, the appeal was refused and the declaration would stand.

4 On 3 August 2015, Mr Robinson made an application to the Tribunal seeking a review of that decision.

The statutory framework

5 Section 33E of the Dog Act provides:

(1) A local government, or on behalf of the local government an authorised person or person specifically authorised by the local government for the purposes of this section either generally or in a particular case, may, by a notice in writing given in accordance with section 33F, declare an individual dog to be a dangerous dog (declared) if, in the opinion of the local government or that person ­

(a) the dog has caused injury or damage by an attack on, or chasing, a person, animal or vehicle; or

(b) the dog has, repeatedly, shown a tendency ­


(i) to attack, or chase, a person, animal or vehicle even though no injury has been caused by that behaviour; or

(ii) to threaten to attack;

or


(c) the behaviour of the dog meets other criteria prescribed for the purpose of this section.

…

6 The definition of 'attack' is set out in s 3 of the Dog Act as follows:

attack, in relation to the behaviour of a dog, does not include behaviour which was an immediate response to, and was induced by, provocation, but includes ­

(a) aggressively rushing at or harassing any person or animal; or

(b) biting, or otherwise causing physical injury to, a person or an animal; or

(c) tearing clothing on, or otherwise causing damage to the property of, the person attacked; or

(d) attempting to attack, or behaving in such a manner toward a person as would cause a reasonable person to fear physical injury,

unless the owner establishes that the behaviour was justified by a reasonable cause[.]

7 Section 33F(1) of the Dog Act requires the owner of a dog to be notified of the making of declaration of a dog to be a dangerous dog as set out below:

The local government, or the person by whom the declaration was made on behalf of the local government, must give written notice declaring a dog to be a dangerous dog (declared) to the owner of that dog.

8 In addition, s 33F(6) provides for an appeal to the Tribunal following the dismissal by the local government of an objection by the owner of the dog to such a declaration as follows:

Where an objection is lodged with a local government in accordance with subsection (2)(b)(i) the local government shall consider it and ­

(a) if the local government dismisses the objection, the owner may, within 7 days after the giving of a notice by the local government as to the dismissal of the objection, apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision[.]

The Tribunal's review jurisdiction

9 The Tribunal's review jurisdiction has been dealt with in some detail in Ioppolo and City of Wanneroo [2013] WASAT 172 (Ioppolo) at [5] and [6] as follows:

In exercising the Tribunal's review jurisdiction, the Tribunal is to review the decision in question by way of a hearing de novo for the purposes of producing the correct and preferable decision on the basis of the information and evidence before the Tribunal at the time of the review (s 27 of the SAT Act). In the exercise of its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal is not limited in its considerations to the material that was before the original decision­maker, nor to a consideration of the original decision­maker's reasoning alone (s 27 of the SAT Act). Section 29(1) of the SAT Act provides that all of the functions and discretions conferred on the original decision­maker are conferred on the Tribunal, in addition to the powers conferred on the Tribunal by the SAT Act. Section 29(3) of the SAT Act confers specific powers on the Tribunal in the disposition of the review application (affirmation or variation of the reviewable decision; setting aside the reviewable decision and instead substituting its own decision; or setting aside the reviewable decision and remitting the 'matter' back to the decision­maker with directions or recommendations).

The Tribunal is not bound to apply the Evidence Act 1966 (WA), the rules of evidence or the practices and procedures of any courts of record (s 32(2)(a) of the SAT Act), but is bound by the rules of natural justice (s 32(1) of the SAT Act) and 'is to act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities' (s 32(2)(b) of the SAT Act). The more flexible procedure provided for by s 32 of the SAT Act, however, does require that Tribunal decisions are made on the basis of evidence that has prohibited force: see Sammut v AVM Holdings Pty Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASC 27 and cases referred to therein. Further, the Tribunal is bound to ensure that all relevant material is disclosed to the Tribunal so as to enable it to determine all of the relevant facts in issue in a proceeding (s 32(7)(a) of the SAT Act). In conducting the proceeding, the Tribunal is to review decisions fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case (s 9(a) of the SAT Act).

The issues

10 The issue in this matter is set out in the respondent's Statement of Issues Facts and Contentions as follows:

Should the Applicant's dog be declared a dangerous dog under section 33E(I) of the Dog Act 1976 (Act).

11 This was not contested by the applicant.

12 The respondent submitted that the decision by the City to declare the dog 'Sheridan' owned by Mr Robinson a dangerous dog is based on the following incidents involving this dog:

• 5 January 2015: Dog on person attack ­ Chased a gentleman whilst he was running in the park and bit his ankles. The respondent issued a Caution following this event.

• 28 January 2015: Dog on person attack ­ Chased same gentleman whilst he was running in the park. The respondent issued an Infringement following this event.

• 5 February 2015: Dog attack general ­ Chased same gentleman whilst running in the park.

• 18 March 2015: Dog on person attack ­ Attack on cricket player at Barridale Park.

• 10 June 2015: Dog attack general ­ Dog acted aggressively towards a frightened child.

• 27 July 2015: Dog attack general ­ Rushed aggressively at council worker.

13 The respondent asserts that in all instances, Sheridan was not under effective control and his owner appears to have taken no action to prevent or stop the incidents.

14 The respondent submits that the fact that Sheridan has been involved in a number of incidents is a concern and it is trying to protect the public by ensuring that Sheridan is adequately controlled and restrained in accordance with the Dog Act.

15 Finally, the respondent submits that it is trying to prevent any further incidents and ensure that Sheridan is under effective control and muzzled in public at all times.

16 Mr Robinson submits that Sheridan is not a dangerous dog. He conceded she needs a little training and advised that the dog trainer thinks her barking and running up to people is a fear response which the trainer is confident can be trained out easily. He also submits that Sheridan has never bitten anyone and he will do whatever is necessary to prevent further offence.

The evidence

17 The incident of 5 January 2015 involved a complaint by Mr Massang that Sheridan had chased him while he was running in Barridale Park. Mr Massang's evidence in regard to this incident is that the dog ran from its owner about 40 meters away towards him while he was jogging, barking and growling. He submits the dog was behaving very aggressively and continued to harass him. Later during his run the dog again ran toward him barking loudly and showing its teeth. The respondent's initial Statement of Issues submits that the dog bit Mr Massang's ankles (incident report dated 6 January 2015 notes 'attempted to [bite] his ankles') and that a Caution under s 33D(2A) of the Dog Act was issued by the City in response to the incident. The caution notice however (Caution No C35083 dated 22 January 2015) describes the incident as 'chase causing no physical injury'. It is to be noted that a further Caution under s 32(4) was issued the same day.

18 The incident of 28 January 2015 is the subject of a further witness statement provided by Mr Massang. His evidence is as follows:

I was about to start my usual morning jog at Barridale Park at 6.15am. I entered the park on the SW corner. As I was walking between the drainage pit and the trees, this dog started barking and rushed towards me. The dog circled me and continued barking continuously. I tried to move away, but the dog followed me. [Its] owner tried calling it 'Sheridan, Sheridan', but it would not respond and continued to bark and harass me. I could not move away until the owner cornered it, held it and put a leash on it. Even still the dog continued to bark at me, straining at the lead[.]

19 This incident resulted in the issue of an infringement under s 32(4) dated 5 February 2015 by the respondent. The penalty of $200 was paid by Mr Robinson.

20 Mr Robinson submits that Mr Massang engineered the chase by walking up to the dog with a GoPro camera ­ to film her barking at him and moving back as he advanced towards her. Ms Massang in cross­examination argued he did not move toward the dog.

21 The incident of 5 February 2015 also involved Mr Massang.

22 Mr Massang gave evidence that at approximately 5:55 am on 4 February 2015, he was walking in Barridale Park between the drainage pit and the trees when Sheridan started barking and rushing towards him. As he attempted to move away the dog followed him and kept barking.

23 While he was exercising, Mr Massang also submits he observed Sheridan barking at two other men who were running on the oval and later barking at a group of women doing group exercises. In cross­examination, Mr Robinson questioned the date when Sheridan may have barked at the two men running on the oval; he did not, however, challenge the nature of the incident.

24 In his evidence, Mr Massang also submitted that, in his view, Mr Robinson tended to be dismissive of his dog's behaviour.

25 The incident of 11 March 2015 (Statement of Issues identifies 18 March 2015 as the date the complaint was received) involved an incident with a cricket player Mehul Gopal during an under 15's Kingsley Woodvale Gold Team cricket training session in Barridale Park.

26 It was submitted that the dog ran through the cricket players apparently targeting one player in particular who has a fear of dogs. The details provided in regard to this incident are as follows:

As the dog kept running, barking and snapping at Mehul Gopal he ran backwards and yelled No multiple times at the dog. Mehul lost his balance as he did this and fell over backward bracing his fall by putting his hand back. Mehul landed on his hand and immediately complained of soreness to his wrist area.

27 It subsequently transpired that Mehul had broken a bone in his wrist and was unable to take any further part in the cricket season.

28 Mr Robinson submits there was no attack. In his view the cricket training was over and the group was standing around talking. His submission is:

Sheridan didn't do anything ­ besides walking through a group of cricketers. The boy didn't need to run backwards, he was largely to blame [for] tripping himself. Sheridan didn't touch him or even bark at him.

29 The incident of 10 June 2015 involved a mother and her two children. Hailing Gunnion provided a witness statement as follows:

I was taking my two children to the park to play. The dog came to us and started to bark at us. I can hear the owner is calling the dog but it didn't stop barking and eventually [it was] circling both me and my younger daughter. My older one [ran] away. I felt threatened. I really didn't want my daughter to feel scared of the dog[.]

30 In regard to this incident, Mr Robinson advised he heard 'Sheridan barking behind me, and found Sheridan having "baled" up a mother and her child a few metres away'. On this occasion he was, however, incapacitated with acute back pain limiting his ability to fully control the dog.

31 Mr Robinson's evidence was that his back pain (intermittent mid thoracic and lower back pain) is fairly frequent and that such an incident could potentially reoccur. However, he is of the view that he is aware of its onset and would in future be able to return home prior to becoming incapacitated.

32 The incident of 27 July 2015 occurred in the public toilet at Barridale Park and involved a council worker, Joel Fisher, who was working at the park.

33 Mr Fisher's evidence was that as he 'opened the toilet door a dog lunged out at me attempting to bite me'.

34 Mr Robinson gave the following account of the incident:

I thought it was a good idea to take Sheridan along with me when I visited the toilet at Barridale Park. She was on the lead and under control when I went to open the door at precisely the same time as the cleaner opened the door from the other side, giving both of us a shock (and Sheridan too), and we both recoiled. There was no attack ­ a lot of shock on both our parts[.]

35 Ms Kenneally, a ranger with the respondent gave evidence of the investigations undertaken by the respondent and the extent of contact between the City and Mr Robinson in regard to the behaviour of the dog. She stressed the need for Mr Robinson to control the dog in a dog exercise area. Ms Kenneally submitted that Mr Robinson seemed dismissive of the attacks and did not take the dog's behaviour seriously. Mr Robinson conceded that the rangers had suggested keeping the dog on a leash on a number of occasions.

36 Mr Robinson took Sheridan for assessment at Kalmpets Animal Behaviour Centre in Balcatta on 11 August 2015.

37 The findings of this assessment, provided to Mr Robinson in correspondence dated the same day, was as follows:

• The above dog has been assessed to screen for behaviours relevant and relating to the 'dangerous dog legislation'.

• The above dog appears to be an Australian Cattle Dog.

• The above dog was tested with humans.

• The above dog did not display aggression towards humans.

• The above dog did not display any behaviours that could be considered 'dangerous' by definition.

• The above dog exhibits behaviour that appears to be within the normal range for the breed and age.

38 The same correspondence did however put forward a number of recommendations, apparently agreed by Mr Robinson, to invest in a behavioural modification program which included a training program to focus on teaching management and effective control in public, a behavioural modification program to focus on reducing possible fear response toward unfamiliar or novel people, and social skills, and the implementation of an enrichment program at the home to ensure the mental needs of the dog are met. The program also included a commitment for the owner to teach the dog to tolerate a muzzle, for the dog to be muzzled and on a lead at all times in a public place, for the dog to wear a harness with a front attachment option, and for the owner to use positive reinforcement techniques.

Tribunal Considerations

39 Section 33F(6) of the Dog Act provides for an appeal to a declaration to the Tribunal following the dismissal by the local government of an objection by the owner of the dog.

40 In applying this provision the questions to be addressed are whether:

a) the dog has caused injury or damage by an attack on, or chasing, a person, animal or vehicle;

b) the dog has, repeatedly, shown a tendency ­


i) to attack, or chase, a person, animal or vehicle even though no injury has been caused by that behaviour; or

ii) to threaten to attack.

41 The immediate issue is whether the reported incidents constitute 'attacks' under the provisions of s 3 of the Dog Act.

42 The relevant tests under the definition of attack established by s 3 of the Dog Act are as follows:

attack, in relation to the behaviour of a dog, does not include behaviour which was an immediate response to, and was induced by, provocation, but includes ­

(a) aggressively rushing at or harassing any person or animal; or

(b) biting, or otherwise causing physical injury to, a person or an animal; or

(c) tearing clothing on, or otherwise causing damage to the property of, the person attacked; or

(d) attempting to attack, or behaving in such a manner toward a person as would cause a reasonable person to fear physical injury,

unless the owner establishes that the behaviour was justified by a reasonable cause[.]

43 In assessing the evidence, it is difficult for the Tribunal to give substantive weight to submissions or witness statements which are not able to be tested in a Tribunal hearing. The evidence in this review is weakened for both parties by the fact that the applicant did not seek to call any witnesses and the respondent chose to limit its witnesses to a single park user and a Council Ranger.

44 The incidents of 5 January 2015, 28 January 2015 and 5 February 2015 did not result in physical injury. However, the witness statements provided establish that Sheridan was 'aggressively rushing at or harassing' a person. In cross­examination on these incidents, Mr Massang presented as a credible witness who provided considered and measured responses under questioning.

45 In this regard, Mr Robinson has conceded that Sheridan 'rushes at people' and has some bad habits such as 'running after runners, particularly in groups such as with football training, bike riders riding across the oval or motor cyclists (she seems to find the noise of motor bike engines particularly annoying)'.

46 The incident of the 11 March 2015 involving the cricketer clearly did result in physical injury which was apparently occasioned by an approach from Sheridan.

47 The incident with the mother and her children and the incident of the council worker involved Sheridan 'behaving in such a manner toward a person as would cause a reasonable person to fear physical injury'.

48 Mr Robinson acknowledged that Sheridan 'did bark at three children' (while on a lead) although in cross­examination, this appears to have been a separate incident. He conceded in written evidence that Sheridan was likely to have barked or lunged forward at the cleaner in the toilet.

49 An issue in assessing this evidence is that no witnesses were called in regard to the three incidents of 11 March, 10 June and 27 July 2015. Thus the Tribunal is only able to give limited weight to such evidence.

50 This caveat applies more significantly to the emails submitted by Mr Robinson from other dog owners using the park.

51 In support of his contention that Sheridan is not a dangerous dog, Mr Robinson submitted emails from Jo Brennan, Jill Sturcke, Lynne Dalby, Peter van der Linden and Cassie McPhie. These parties are dog owners who use Barridale Park for exercising their own dogs. While Ms Dalby submits that she has 'never seen any aggression from Sheridan' the other four all submit that Sheridan is not in their opinion a dangerous dog. Ms McPhie does suggest Sheridan has some 'bad manners' which include jumping on people, running towards noisy motorbikes and sometimes not listening to her owner but this is in the context that she would never interpret such behaviour as aggressive and it is likely to be partly due to the fact that Sheridan is still quite young. While these documents generally support the contention that Sheridan is not a dangerous dog, none of those people making these submissions claimed any knowledge of the six incidents addressed in this review.

52 Mr Robinson also raised the issue of the Tribunal's decision in Gillam and City of Fremantle [2010] WASAT 141. In that review, however, a number of concerns had been raised with the evidence submitted which left the Tribunal 'with a real concern about the reliability of the complainant's evidence'. In addition, in that review, a great deal of evidence attesting to the general good nature of the dog was provided including witness statements and a petition signed by 150 customers of the applicant's shop where the dog spent extended periods of time. These circumstances are more than adequate to differentiate that review from the evidence before the Tribunal in the current review.

53 In considering all of the circumstances set out above, the Tribunal finds that on the basis of the evidence before it, the three incidents of 5 and 28 January and 5 February 2015 did constitute 'attacks' in terms of the definition established in s 3 of the Dog Act.

54 The evidence regarding both the incidents of 11 March 2015 involving the cricketer, and 27 July 2015 involving the council worker, are contested by Mr Robinson. He suggested the former was 'an abnormal reaction to the proximity [of] a dog' and that '[t]he boy didn't need to run backwards, and he was largely to blame for tripping himself.' In regard to the latter incident in the toilet, Mr Robinson argues that there was no attack and while initially assuming Sheridan may have barked or lunged forward, in cross­examination, he suggested he could not remember and disputed whether the dog had lunged forward. Based on this evidence, it is not open to the Tribunal to definitively find that these incidents constituted an 'attack' under the provisions of the Dog Act.

55 In regard to the incident of 10 June 2015, based on the evidence available to it, including the admission of Mr Robinson that 'Sheridan tends to chase and herd children' and that 'the children and mother appeared terrified' the Tribunal finds that an 'attack' did occur.

56 The second question is the weight to be given to the number of incidents and the time period of their occurrence.

57 The six incidents under consideration occurred between January 2015 and July 2015, with two incidents in January, one in February, one in March, one in June and one in July. Evidence was provided by Mr Robinson that during the intervening period, between the March and June incidents, he was away and Sheridan was in kennels for nine weeks.

58 It is clear from evidence provided to the Tribunal that during this seven month period, there has been considerable involvement by a range of council officers in responding to complaints regarding the behaviour of Sheridan. This has included extensive documented interaction and communication with Mr Robinson.

59 The correspondence from Kalmpets, submitted in evidence by the applicant, suggests Mr Robinson has agreed to implement a range of initiatives directed to more effectively controlling Sheridan's behaviour. Interestingly, while a number of these reflect provisions set out under s 33GA of the Dog Act as requirements for the management of dangerous dogs (use of a muzzle and a lead), the behavioural modification and enrichment program go well beyond those requirements. This suggests that Mr Robinson recognises that there are behavioural issues which need to be addressed.

Conclusion

60 On balance, given the evidence before it in this matter, the Tribunal finds that a number of the incidents involving Sheridan do constitute 'attacks' under the Dog Act and that, in addition, the dog has shown a repeated tendency to attack, chase or threaten to attack.

61 As set out in Ioppolo at [54]:

The purpose of s 33E of the Dog Act is public safety. The public should feel safe and be safe from dogs that are aggressive. The restrictions and requirements that flow from a declaration serve to warn the public about dogs that have been aggressive. The purpose of s 33E of the Dog Act is not to punish the dog or the owner of the dog. It is not penal in nature[.]

62 In this case, the fact of the attacks and chasing is relevant, as is the number of attacks over a reasonably extended period of time. In this context, the Tribunal therefore finds Sheridan could legitimately be considered for the issue of a notice declaring her a dangerous dog under the Dog Act.

63 This outcome is unfortunate, as from the evidence before it in this review, the Tribunal is of the opinion that had Mr Robinson been less dismissive of the concerns raised with him on a number of occasions by the respondent's rangers and acted promptly to address those concerns, this outcome may potentially have been avoided.

64 However, in the Tribunal's view, the respondent's decisions to declare Sheridan to be a 'dangerous' dog pursuant to s 33E(1)(a) of the Dog Act was the correct and preferable decision, and the Tribunal affirms the respondent's decision.

65 For these reasons the application for review is dismissed and the decision of the respondent is affirmed.

Orders

1. The application for review of the City of Joondalup notice of 24 July 2015 is dismissed.

2. 'Sheridan' remains a dangerous dog (declared) and must be kept in accordance with the requirements of keeping a dangerous dog under the Dog Act 1976 (WA), as set out in the City of Joondalup's notice of 24 July 2015.

I certify that this and the preceding [65] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

___________________________________

MR P DE VILLIERS, MEMBER