Roberts v The Queen

Roberts appealed against the refusal of bail pending his retrial for murder. The respondent, The Queen, opposed the appeal. The appellant's previous convictions for murder were quashed by the High Court after 20 years of incarceration, and a retrial was ordered. Roberts applied for bail pending the retrial, which was refused by a judge of the Supreme Court. The judge found that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify bail and that the refusal was reasonably open. The appeal was based on the argument that the refusal was unreasonable due to the injustice of the corrupted trial and the resulting hardship of incarceration.

The legal issues before the court were whether exceptional circumstances existed that justified the grant of bail and whether the period of custody constituted a pre-trial delay. The appellant argued that the period of incarceration before the quashing of his convictions constituted a pre-trial delay, and the injustice of the corrupted trial and the hardship of incarceration constituted exceptional circumstances. The respondent submitted that the refusal of bail was reasonably open and that there was no specific error in the judge's decision.

The court held that the period of custody did not constitute a pre-trial delay, and the injustice of the corrupted trial and the hardship of incarceration did not constitute exceptional circumstances. The court found that the appellant's incarceration was a consequence of his criminal conduct and not a result of any error or miscarriage of justice. The court also held that the refusal of bail was reasonably open, and there was no specific error in the judge's decision. The appeal was dismissed, and the refusal of bail was upheld.

The court did not make any orders as the appeal was dismissed. The appellant remained in custody pending his retrial for murder. The court found that the refusal of bail was reasonably open and that there were no exceptional circumstances that justified the grant of bail. The court held that the injustice of the corrupted trial and the hardship of incarceration did not constitute exceptional circumstances, and the period of custody did not constitute a pre-trial delay.