Robert Bruce Suffolk v Clare Mary Meere

This case involved an appeal to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory concerning the assessment of damages for personal injuries. The appellant, Robert Bruce Suffolk, had been injured in a motor vehicle accident on 16 June 1990, when he was struck by a car driven by the respondent, Clare Mary Meere. Liability for the accident was admitted, and the appeal focused solely on the quantum of damages awarded by the Master. The appellant sustained fractures to his left hand and left patella, and subsequently developed chronic pain syndrome and major depressive illness, which the Master found had substantially incapacitated him for work.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the Master had erred in assessing the damages, particularly concerning the component for loss of future earning capacity, general damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, and damages for future gratuitous care. The appellant argued that the Master had failed to adopt a reasoned, mathematical approach to future economic loss and that the discount applied was insufficient given his limited prospects of future employment. The respondent cross-appealed, contending that the Master's finding of total incapacity for work up to the date of trial was inconsistent with the finding of residual earning capacity.

The majority of the Court of Appeal, comprising Crispin P and Higgins J, found that while the Master had not strictly followed the approach mandated in *Gamser v Nominal Defendant*, his method of calculating future economic loss was not entirely intuitive. However, they identified errors in the Master's reasoning, including the calculation of damages based on a notional retirement at age 65 without applying a discount rate and an excessive 50% reduction. The Court determined that the appellant would likely have maintained his employment as a security guard until age 55, with some allowance for earlier retirement and residual earning capacity. They reassessed future economic loss accordingly. The Court also increased the award for general damages, considering the devastating impact of the accident on the appellant's life, and increased the award for future gratuitous care, finding the Master's allowance inadequate for the extended period of potential need. The cross-appeal was dismissed, with the Court finding no inconsistency in the Master's findings regarding past total incapacity and future residual capacity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal, set aside the Master's award of $895,168, and entered judgment for the appellant in the sum of $990,869. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, including any costs incurred in relation to the cross-appeal. The dissenting judgment of Miles CJ would have dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's assessment of damages.