Riemann and Riemann and Ors (No 6)

In the matter of *Riemann and Riemann and Ors (No 6)*, the wife sought the recusal of McClelland J from proceedings on the grounds of a reasonable apprehension of bias. The core of the dispute concerned allegations of judicial bias, either actual or ostensible, which the wife contended prevented the fair conduct of the proceedings.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the judicial officer was biased or ostensibly biased, and consequently, whether the test for apprehended bias, as established in cases such as *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy*, could be applied to warrant recusal. The Court was required to determine if the circumstances presented gave rise to a perception of impartiality that a fair-minded lay observer might hold.

McClelland J applied the principles governing apprehended bias, referencing established High Court authority. The Court considered the objective test for apprehended bias, which requires an examination of whether a reasonable member of the public, knowing the relevant facts, would apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the issues before them. Having considered the wife's contentions and the relevant legal framework, McClelland J concluded that recusal was appropriate.

Consequently, the Court ordered that McClelland J recuse himself from the proceedings. The matter was to be relisted for mention before another judicial officer as soon as practicable.