Ridley v Whipp

The case of *Ridley v Whipp* involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Ridley, sought to prohibit further proceedings on a summons issued against him under the *Infant Protection Act 1904* (N.S.W.). The summons was based on a complaint made by the respondent, Whipp, a single woman alleging she was with child by Ridley and that he had made no adequate provision for expenses. Ridley contended that the justices who issued the summons lacked jurisdiction because the complainant had not produced the required corroborative evidence on oath at the time of making the complaint.

The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. Firstly, what constitutes sufficient corroborative evidence under section 4 of the *Infant Protection Act 1904*, particularly when reliance is placed on evidence of opportunity for intercourse. Secondly, whether the production of such corroborative evidence is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the justices to issue a summons or warrant under the Act, and if not, what remedy is available to a party against whom a summons has been issued without such evidence.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Griffith C.J., Barton, Gavan Duffy, and Rich JJ., held that the corroborative evidence required by section 4 must be given by a person other than the complainant whose statement is to be corroborated. Furthermore, evidence of opportunity for intercourse, without additional circumstances suggesting the probability of its occurrence, is insufficient corroboration. The Court also held that the production of this corroborative evidence is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the justices to issue a summons or warrant. Consequently, a summons issued without the requisite corroboration is a nullity, and prohibition is the appropriate remedy to restrain further proceedings. Isaacs J. dissented on the issue of prohibition, arguing that the summons defect was not necessarily a jurisdictional one that could not be waived, and that prohibition was an inappropriate and overly burdensome remedy in this context, potentially undermining the Act's purpose of providing timely protection for infants.

The High Court allowed the appeal, reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The order of the Supreme Court was discharged, except for the costs awarded to the respondent Whipp. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent Whipp's costs of the High Court appeal.