Riaz and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy

This matter concerned an application for review of an objection to a bankrupt's discharge, brought by the applicant, Riaz, against the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy. The Inspector-General had relied on three grounds for objecting to the discharge, as enumerated in section 149D of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth): the bankrupt's intentional failure to disclose a beneficial interest in a property, a void transfer of a property to his wife, and the bankrupt's intentional provision of false or misleading information to the trustee. The applicant sought review of these grounds, arguing that the evidence did not support their existence.

The court was required to determine whether the applicant's request for review of the grounds of objection appeared to justify a review, as contemplated by section 149N of the Act. Specifically, the court had to consider whether there was a genuine contest on the evidence regarding the applicant's beneficial interest in a property and whether the transfer of another property to his wife was void against the trustee. The court also had to consider the extent to which the Inspector-General was bound by the specific evidence relied upon by the trustee in the initial notice of objection.

Regarding the first ground, the court found that the applicant's argument that the payment was to discharge a debt owed to his wife, rather than creating a beneficial interest, had merit, suggesting insufficient evidence to support the ground. Therefore, a review of this ground appeared justified. However, concerning the second ground, the court determined that even if the property transfer was to discharge a debt, it would still be void against the trustee as a transfer in favour of a creditor that gave an advantage over others. Thus, on any version of the facts, this ground could be made out, and a review was not justified on this basis. The court also noted that while the Inspector-General was bound by the grounds of objection, they were not necessarily bound by the specific evidence relied upon by the trustee, particularly where new evidence was available.

Ultimately, notwithstanding reservations about the Inspector-General's approach, the decision under review was affirmed. The court indicated a preference for a more practical and less labour-intensive approach to the gateway provision for review, focusing on whether a request "appear[ed]" to justify review.