Rees & Stroud

In the matter of *Rees & Stroud*, Ms Rees (the applicant mother) sought to re-contest final parenting orders made by consent in July 2018, following a 2014 trial. Mr Stroud (the respondent father) opposed the application, arguing there had been no material change in circumstances. The mother contended that a significant passage of time, her lack of contact with the child for three years, her improved mental health, and her relocation closer to the child's school constituted a material change. The father maintained that the mother had not discharged the burden of establishing a sufficiently serious and significant change in circumstances.

McEvoy J was required to determine whether the mother had demonstrated a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant re-contesting the final parenting orders. The court also considered an application for costs made by the father.

His Honour applied the principles established in *Rice & Asplund*, which require a party seeking to re-litigate parenting orders to demonstrate a material change in circumstances. The court found that the mother had failed to establish any such material change. Consequently, the mother's application was dismissed.

The court ordered that the applicant mother's amended initiating application be dismissed. The father's application for costs was adjourned, with directions for the filing of further material by the father, the mother's solicitor, and the mother herself, before the matter was listed for further hearing on 13 September 2021.