Redgrave v Redgrave

The case of *Redgrave v Redgrave* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales regarding permanent alimony following a dissolution of marriage. The parties were the former wife, Maud Mary Redgrave (the appellant), and the former husband, Lancelot Mervyn Redgrave (the respondent). The dispute arose from the wife's application for secured permanent alimony after their marriage was dissolved on the grounds of desertion.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether Section 39 of the *Matrimonial Causes Act 1899-1929* (N.S.W.) permitted the court to order a husband to provide security for permanent alimony by way of a personal covenant, in addition to or as part of security over property. The court was also required to determine the appropriate amount of alimony and the nature of the security to be ordered, considering the financial circumstances of both parties.

The High Court held that Section 39 of the Act did permit the inclusion of a personal covenant by the husband as part of the security for permanent alimony. The Court reasoned that the word "secure" did not exclude personal security and that historical practice, supported by various English and New South Wales decisions, indicated that personal covenants were commonly included in such security arrangements. The Court disapproved of a dictum in *Shearn v. Shearn* that suggested a personal covenant was not permissible. The Court found that the annual sum ordered by the lower courts was insufficient and, after considering the parties' circumstances, including the husband's remarriage and business interests, and the wife's needs, increased the annual sum to £350.

The High Court allowed the wife's appeal and dismissed the husband's cross-appeal. The order of the Supreme Court was varied to increase the annual sum to £350, to be secured to the petitioner for her life or until remarriage. The security was to include the personal covenant of the respondent, binding himself and his executors, and was to be secured over his land and dwelling and his life policy, in lieu of the cash previously ordered. The Registrar was directed to settle the appropriate instrument and to fix the periodical intervals of payment, with liberty to apply to the Supreme Court. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceedings in the Supreme Court.