3 03
C h T C H W O R D S
| Ek[\KRirFTCY - appllcatlon | for leave to entec o b ] ~ c t l n n to |
| alscharqe - ~nterln relief | souqht | - | ~ u r ~ s d ~ c t l o n | to lengthen |
| period | of h a n l r ~ u F t c 7 - whether | can extend | for a | period under |
s.l19(i2).
i
MINUTES OF ORDER
PINCUS J.
| 28 JUME 1995 | I |
| YRISBAME |
| IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA | ) | ||
| GEIQERAL DIVISION |
| ||
| BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF "HE SOUTHERN ) CISTRICT OF THE STATE: OF OUEEhJSLAND ) |
| RE: | WILLIAM | MOORE |
| M FARTE: | DiE NOMINAL DEFENDANT |
PINCUS J.
| This | i s s n | a p p l i c a t i o n made | by t h e | PJomlnai Defendant |
| (Queensland) :or | l e a v e | t o | e n t e r | an | ob jec t lon | E O | t h e d l scha rae | of |
| the | bankrupt | pur'?uanz | t o S. 149 of | ths Bqnkruntcy Act | 1566, In |
| which | the | applicant | seeks | i n t e r i n | r e l i e f . | The | application has |
| been | served | on the | bankrup t , | bu | t | t he | a f f ldav l t | of | Mlchael | Gera rd |
| Wadley discloses | tha ' , | service | W ~ S | e f f e c t e d on117 | on | 26 June | 1985, |
| two d a y s | sgo. | Counsel | for the | applLcant | does | not | ccntenrl | t h a t |
| t h e | service | wr-.s | w l t n i n | s u f f i c i e n t | tlme | t o | e n a b l e | the | t-ankrupt |
| reasonably | E O | r e s l s t | t o d a y , | a n d , | 11-1 | any | event , | Mr | Wadley says |
| thlt he | had d cnnversa t ion w1ch rhe bhnkrupt | tsday I n which | the |
| bankrupt | Gas | t o l d t h a t | the | a p p l i c a t i o n WGUld | be | x i ] n ~ b r n & fs2r | E m 3 |
| weeks. | Al thouqh | the | conversat ion | deposed | to | 7 1 i l l | r h j l e y G?ot:ld |
| no t | necessa r l lp | have | q lven | t he | bankrupt | the | ~ ? t p r l - . - ~ l ? n | t h a t | 'IC |
| 5hould | not | appedr | today, | It | seems t o me | +,hat i have | t o assume |
| that | he would | h a v e Taken | ~t | t h a t Lhe | srtbstantir 'e application |
would not prcceed
2 .
| The mar;erial shows that | the | applicant | I S tbe | m l y |
L
| credltor, belng owed a large sum oi money. | The bankrupt became |
so on l July 1982 on his own petition, and by vlrtue of the Act would be dlscharged, ordmarlly, three pears from that date, 1 . e .
| In two day's tlme. That follows from | s . 1 4 9 ( 1 \ , | whicn reads:- |
| "Sublect to this section, a person | ~ j h o becomes a |
bankrupt after the commencement of this sectlon
| 1s. by force of this | seccion. | unless | sooner |
| discharges 19 accordance | wlth | sectlon | 150, |
| discharged from bankruptcy upon explratlon | of | 3 |
| years from the date | of the bankruptcy." |
The dlfflculty f o r the applicant i3 that by the tlme the perlod of two weeks mentloned to the bankrupt explres. if nothlng else 1 s done, s.149!i) wlll have done Its work, and dlscharged the
| bankrupt from bankruptcy. There | is no qenerai power | m the Act |
| to vary its operatlon, but there | is power under 5 . 3 7 | to vary the |
| operation of orders. However, there | is no sequestratlon ,3rder |
| here, and | In any event s . 3 7 ( 2 ) | expressly excludes spquestrat1on |
| orders. |
The materlal discloses some merit ln the ,appllcat;on to
enter an oblectlon, and as a matter of d l s e r e L l o n I wzuld be
lncllned to give the appllcant interim relief. lf able to do s o .
| That IS, although counsel | f o r the appllcant candidly admits that |
| It comes to the | Co~irr; very late, If there were :urlsdlrtlon to do |
| so I would make | an order ho ldmq thlngc: In statu | quo fer the |
period of two weeks deslred.
3
| The questlon 1 s whether I have any power to do that. | I |
| have received assistance. | n o t only from | M i s s Ghdley, as counsel |
| for the applicant, but | From Mr A.H. Carrlck, the Act!nq Offlclal |
Pzcelver. Mr Carrlck, although formally adopt;nq 3 neutral ro l e , has sugqest,ed to me I have no Iurisdlction to w k e any 6rde:- G€ the kind sought.
S
| The first of the two bases upon whlch the matter | was put |
| on behalf of tEl? applicant b a s that I might makr an 1r.ter1m | rJrder |
| under | s . 1 4 9 ( 8 ) . | :-lowever, It seems clzar, bechuse of the |
| sub-section's rererence to | a period exceedmq flve gears, that I |
| cannot do so . | Secondly, it was said that I mlqht mske an order |
| under s.149(12), havlng the effect of | 1engthePinq the period of |
| thcee years mentioned in s.145(1). | The terms n f s.149'12) ace as |
| follows:- |
| "The Court may, at any time before | the dlschary of |
a bankrupt, on the application of th? Reglscrar,
the Inspector-General, the trus-cee or 3 cred1 c o r ,
| dl-rect that the bankrupt shall nor | t.9 discharqed |
from bankruptcy by virtue of chls sect~m."
Tlze submission aade by MISS Wadley was tha? I mrght properly
| apply the sectlcn | in such a way as to acki1eve 9 temporary |
| suspension | of the operation | of | s.149(1). | Mt C z r r ~ c k . on the |
| other hand, | submitted that s .149(12 ) cannot | h;l,/e | i;nl:J | a a a r t l a l |
| operation, and that If | an order is made uncJr ;t, ?hen .s.14'4 |
| becomes | irrelevant: | s o far | as | the | date | ci the | bankrupt ' 5 |
| discharqe is concerned, there IS | then no tlme llmlt. and he mu55 |
| apply | f o r discharqe under 5 . 1 5 0 . |
4.
1 have noted that Toohey J. had a Sugerflcially simllar
t
| matcer before him In the case | of Re Mercovigb (Inreported, 27 May |
| 1985) where | a holdlng order had been made by the Supreme Court, | L |
| extendlng beycjnd flve years the period | \w.,?!n nb:ectlfJl< WYUid |
expire, to enable the hearing of a substantive applicstlon. However, in that case, advantage was able to be taken of the fact that there was an ob~ection from the Offlrlal liereiver and It was
| posslble | to | extend | that under | s . l -19 (8 ) so | as to | preserve | the | i |
| position. In | this case, there is no | o5jectlon entered, and, In |
| any event, | s.149(0) does not help fo r the reason have already |
| mentioned. |
| The | que5tlon then becomes whether | s.149(1?.) | should be |
read as lf It said:-
| " . | . . | direct | that | the | bankrupt | s h a l l | not, | be |
discharged f ron bankruptcy by virtue af t h i S
| sectxon | until | the | date | speclf: ?d | I n | the_ |
| direct-ia. | " |
| The submlssions mede by Miss Wadley would have | mc so read It. Mr |
| Carrick's contentlon, on the cther hand, 1s Fnat | the provlslon |
| should be read quite literally: that | I | r m - ~ make | a cl~rect~on |
| under It only if the consequence 1s intended | :?..at | 5.149 have no |
operation henceforth. I have not been referred t c any authority
wlth respect to the polnk just mentioned, but 1 k v e come to the
| concluzion that the contention | ma&e by Mr Carrick 1s correcr, and |
| that I | cannot make what mlght be called | a hrJldlng | order under |
| s.l49(12), althouqh 1 woluld, as 1: | have Indicated, do lt I f 1 had |
| the power. |
| Other suggestions were made, more | fainclp, as to sources |
| of power. | The only one r8?hich 1 should mention 1 s that attention |
| was drahn to s.30(1) | (b) | , which permlts the Courr; to make orders |
of an lnterlocutory lilnd. In my view, t h e ~ r o v ~ s l o n does not ass:st here, because the order sought could r.r#t be described as
| one, "necessary for the purposes | of carrying out or qlving effect |
| to this Act . . | . I ' | It would rsther be | one designed tu circunvent |
| the effect | of s.149(1) which, as I | have mefitioned, achleves E h e |
| result that there | is an autoinatic discharge unless an order 15 |
| made under the later sub-sections. | I cannot rea3 that provlslan |
| l | 1 |
- that 15, s.143(1) - as subject al.so to a power to extend the period o€ bankruptcy for a short o r long time under 5.30. It may
1
| be that there | 1s a Lacuna in | the Act, but | I do not thjnk the |
| aethod of | meeting the difficulty sugges~ed | by the | applicant 1 s |
| correct, nor have | I been able to see that any ocher provislon of |
the Act allows me to make an order extel-idlng the perlod of
i
| bankruptcy | for | 3 short time, pending | the | hearing | of | an |
| application f o r leave to enter | an objectlon. |
| - | L should add that it was not contended bp the applxcant |
| that I could heat the principal applicatlon for leavs today. | It |
| seems clear In the circumstances that | I cannot, ~ecai15e Qf the |
| indication given | 'CO the bankrupt, mentloned .ibove. | i therefore |
| dismiss | the | appllcatlon | f o r | interim | rellef. | Counsel | has |
| lndlcated that in | consequence the princlpal applicaclon | will not |
| be pursued and I a l s o | dlsmlss the appllcatlon im7r | Zmve to enter |
| ; | c+:-(,{)# | ,L | I! | ;: | - | . | ~ | L , | i | -c |
| an objectlon. | , I |
| r | - - r ,-c :;r | I | , |
| paces are n i! | L c . |
| ILld;lTCI:t | l,c.te,n c | ; a , : | i IcI:cLu | - | . | > |
| Mr. JUS~ICC | P!nca: | . ,c | i | / 3 , .- |
| </7/?,C | )\ss.;: | '51L |
| Dated |
- AGLC
- Re Moore, W. v Ex parte The Nominal Defendent [1985] FCA 303
- Case
- [1985] FCA 303
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Pincus J considered whether Section 149(8) or Section 149(12) could be interpreted to permit an interim injunction. Section 149(8) explicitly references periods exceeding five years, which was not applicable in this case. As for Section 149(12), the court had to decide whether it could be used for a temporary suspension of the operation of Section 149(1). While the Nominal Defendant argued for a temporary injunction, the Acting Official Receiver contended that Section 149(12) should be read literally, meaning it could only be used to prevent discharge indefinitely, not temporarily. Pincus J concluded that the Acting Official Receiver's interpretation was correct, and thus, the court could not grant a temporary injunction under Section 149(12).
The court also considered whether other sections of the Act could provide the necessary jurisdiction. Section 30(1)(b) allows the court to make interlocutory orders necessary for carrying out the Act. However, Pincus J found that the sought order was not necessary for this purpose but rather intended to circumvent the automatic discharge under Section 149(1). Therefore, Section 30(1)(b) did not apply.
Given that the application for interim relief was dismissed, the principal application for leave to enter an objection was also dismissed as it would not be pursued. The court ruled that it lacked the jurisdiction to extend the period of bankruptcy temporarily to allow for the hearing of the substantive application.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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