Re Moore, W. v Ex parte The Nominal Defendent

Case [1985] FCA 303


3 03

C h T C H W O R D S

Ek[\KRirFTCY - appllcatlon

for leave to entec o b ] ~ c t l n n to

alscharqe - ~nterln relief

souqht

-

~ u r ~ s d ~ c t l o n

to lengthen

period

of h a n l r ~ u F t c 7 - whether

can extend

for a

period under

s.l19(i2).

i

MINUTES OF ORDER

PINCUS J.

28 JUME 1995

I

YRISBAME

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

GEIQERAL DIVISION

)

PET NO. CQlO of 1982

BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF "HE SOUTHERN ) CISTRICT OF THE STATE: OF OUEEhJSLAND )

RE:

WILLIAM

MOORE

M FARTE:

DiE NOMINAL DEFENDANT

PINCUS J.

This

i s s n

a p p l i c a t i o n made

by t h e

PJomlnai Defendant

(Queensland) :or

l e a v e

t o

e n t e r

an

ob jec t lon

E O

t h e d l scha rae

of

the

bankrupt

pur'?uanz

t o S. 149 of

ths Bqnkruntcy Act

1566, In

which

the

applicant

seeks

i n t e r i n

r e l i e f .

The

application has

been

served

on the

bankrup t ,

bu

t

t he

a f f ldav l t

of

Mlchael

Gera rd

Wadley discloses

tha ' ,

service

W ~ S

e f f e c t e d on117

on

26 June

1985,

two d a y s

sgo.

Counsel

for the

applLcant

does

not

ccntenrl

t h a t

t h e

service

wr-.s

w l t n i n

s u f f i c i e n t

tlme

t o

e n a b l e

the

t-ankrupt

reasonably

E O

r e s l s t

t o d a y ,

a n d ,

11-1

any

event ,

Mr

Wadley says

thlt he

had d cnnversa t ion w1ch rhe bhnkrupt

tsday I n which

the

bankrupt

Gas

t o l d t h a t

the

a p p l i c a t i o n WGUld

be

x i ] n ~ b r n & fs2r

E m 3

weeks.

Al thouqh

the

conversat ion

deposed

to

7 1 i l l

r h j l e y G?ot:ld

no t

necessa r l lp

have

q lven

t he

bankrupt

the

~ ? t p r l - . - ~ l ? n

t h a t

'IC

5hould

not

appedr

today,

It

seems t o me

+,hat i have

t o assume

that

he would

h a v e Taken

~t

t h a t Lhe

srtbstantir 'e application

would not prcceed

2 .

The mar;erial shows that

the

applicant

I S tbe

m l y

L

credltor, belng owed a large sum oi money.

The bankrupt became

so on l July 1982 on his own petition, and by vlrtue of the Act would be dlscharged, ordmarlly, three pears from that date, 1 . e .

In two day's tlme. That follows from

s . 1 4 9 ( 1 \ ,

whicn reads:-

"Sublect to this section, a person

~ j h o becomes a

bankrupt after the commencement of this sectlon

1s. by force of this

seccion.

unless

sooner

discharges 19 accordance

wlth

sectlon

150,

discharged from bankruptcy upon explratlon

of

3

years from the date

of the bankruptcy."

The dlfflculty f o r the applicant i3 that by the tlme the perlod of two weeks mentloned to the bankrupt explres. if nothlng else 1 s done, s.149!i) wlll have done Its work, and dlscharged the

bankrupt from bankruptcy. There

is no qenerai power

m the Act

to vary its operatlon, but there

is power under 5 . 3 7

to vary the

operation of orders. However, there

is no sequestratlon ,3rder

here, and

In any event s . 3 7 ( 2 )

expressly excludes spquestrat1on

orders.

The materlal discloses some merit ln the ,appllcat;on to

enter an oblectlon, and as a matter of d l s e r e L l o n I wzuld be

lncllned to give the appllcant interim relief. lf able to do s o .

That IS, although counsel

f o r the appllcant candidly admits that

It comes to the

Co~irr; very late, If there were :urlsdlrtlon to do

so I would make

an order ho ldmq thlngc: In statu

quo fer the

period of two weeks deslred.

3

The questlon 1 s whether I have any power to do that.

I

have received assistance.

n o t only from

M i s s Ghdley, as counsel

for the applicant, but

From Mr A.H. Carrlck, the Act!nq Offlclal

Pzcelver. Mr Carrlck, although formally adopt;nq 3 neutral ro l e , has sugqest,ed to me I have no Iurisdlction to w k e any 6rde:- G€ the kind sought.

S

The first of the two bases upon whlch the matter

was put

on behalf of tEl? applicant b a s that I might makr an 1r.ter1m

rJrder

under

s . 1 4 9 ( 8 ) .

:-lowever, It seems clzar, bechuse of the

sub-section's rererence to

a period exceedmq flve gears, that I

cannot do so .

Secondly, it was said that I mlqht mske an order

under s.149(12), havlng the effect of

1engthePinq the period of

thcee years mentioned in s.145(1).

The terms n f s.149'12) ace as

follows:-

"The Court may, at any time before

the dlschary of

a bankrupt, on the application of th? Reglscrar,

the Inspector-General, the trus-cee or 3 cred1 c o r ,

dl-rect that the bankrupt shall nor

t.9 discharqed

from bankruptcy by virtue of chls sect~m."

Tlze submission aade by MISS Wadley was tha? I mrght properly

apply the sectlcn

in such a way as to acki1eve 9 temporary

suspension

of the operation

of

s.149(1).

Mt C z r r ~ c k . on the

other hand,

submitted that s .149(12 ) cannot

h;l,/e

i;nl:J

a a a r t l a l

operation, and that If

an order is made uncJr ;t, ?hen .s.14'4

becomes

irrelevant:

s o far

as

the

date

ci the

bankrupt ' 5

discharqe is concerned, there IS

then no tlme llmlt. and he mu55

apply

f o r discharqe under 5 . 1 5 0 .

4.

1 have noted that Toohey J. had a Sugerflcially simllar

t

matcer before him In the case

of Re Mercovigb (Inreported, 27 May

1985) where

a holdlng order had been made by the Supreme Court,

L

extendlng beycjnd flve years the period

\w.,?!n nb:ectlfJl< WYUid

expire, to enable the hearing of a substantive applicstlon. However, in that case, advantage was able to be taken of the fact that there was an ob~ection from the Offlrlal liereiver and It was

posslble

to

extend

that under

s . l -19 (8 ) so

as to

preserve

the

i

position. In

this case, there is no

o5jectlon entered, and, In

any event,

s.149(0) does not help fo r the reason have already

mentioned.

The

que5tlon then becomes whether

s.149(1?.)

should be

read as lf It said:-

" .

. .

direct

that

the

bankrupt

s h a l l

not,

be

discharged f ron bankruptcy by virtue af t h i S

sectxon

until

the

date

speclf: ?d

I n

the_

direct-ia.

"

The submlssions mede by Miss Wadley would have

mc so read It. Mr

Carrick's contentlon, on the cther hand, 1s Fnat

the provlslon

should be read quite literally: that

I

r m - ~ make

a cl~rect~on

under It only if the consequence 1s intended

:?..at

5.149 have no

operation henceforth. I have not been referred t c any authority

wlth respect to the polnk just mentioned, but 1 k v e come to the

concluzion that the contention

ma&e by Mr Carrick 1s correcr, and

that I

cannot make what mlght be called

a hrJldlng

order under

s.l49(12), althouqh 1 woluld, as 1:

have Indicated, do lt I f 1 had

the power.

Other suggestions were made, more

fainclp, as to sources

of power.

The only one r8?hich 1 should mention 1 s that attention

was drahn to s.30(1)

(b)

, which permlts the Courr; to make orders

of an lnterlocutory lilnd. In my view, t h e ~ r o v ~ s l o n does not ass:st here, because the order sought could r.r#t be described as

one, "necessary for the purposes

of carrying out or qlving effect

to this Act . .

. I '

It would rsther be

one designed tu circunvent

the effect

of s.149(1) which, as I

have mefitioned, achleves E h e

result that there

is an autoinatic discharge unless an order 15

made under the later sub-sections.

I cannot rea3 that provlslan

l

1

- that 15, s.143(1) - as subject al.so to a power to extend the period o€ bankruptcy for a short o r long time under 5.30. It may

1

be that there

1s a Lacuna in

the Act, but

I do not thjnk the

aethod of

meeting the difficulty sugges~ed

by the

applicant 1 s

correct, nor have

I been able to see that any ocher provislon of

the Act allows me to make an order extel-idlng the perlod of

i

bankruptcy

for

3 short time, pending

the

hearing

of

an

application f o r leave to enter

an objectlon.

-

L should add that it was not contended bp the applxcant

that I could heat the principal applicatlon for leavs today.

It

seems clear In the circumstances that

I cannot, ~ecai15e Qf the

indication given

'CO the bankrupt, mentloned .ibove.

i therefore

dismiss

the

appllcatlon

f o r

interim

rellef.

Counsel

has

lndlcated that in

consequence the princlpal applicaclon

will not

be pursued and I a l s o

dlsmlss the appllcatlon im7r

Zmve to enter

;

c+:-(,{)#

,L

I!

;:

-

.

~

L ,

i

-c

an objectlon.

, I

r

- - r ,-c :;r

I

,

paces are n i!

L c .

ILld;lTCI:t

l,c.te,n c

; a , :

i IcI:cLu

-

.

>

Mr. JUS~ICC

P!nca:

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)\ss.;:

'51L

Dated

Details
AGLC
Re Moore, W. v Ex parte The Nominal Defendent [1985] FCA 303
Case
[1985] FCA 303
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the Federal Court of Australia was an application by the Nominal Defendant, seeking leave to enter an objection to the discharge of William Moore from bankruptcy under Section 149 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The Nominal Defendant also sought an interim injunction to prevent the discharge. Pincus J was tasked with determining whether he had the jurisdiction to grant such interim relief. The primary legal issue was whether the court had the authority to extend the period of bankruptcy temporarily, under Section 149(12), to allow for the hearing of an application to object to the discharge.

Pincus J considered whether Section 149(8) or Section 149(12) could be interpreted to permit an interim injunction. Section 149(8) explicitly references periods exceeding five years, which was not applicable in this case. As for Section 149(12), the court had to decide whether it could be used for a temporary suspension of the operation of Section 149(1). While the Nominal Defendant argued for a temporary injunction, the Acting Official Receiver contended that Section 149(12) should be read literally, meaning it could only be used to prevent discharge indefinitely, not temporarily. Pincus J concluded that the Acting Official Receiver's interpretation was correct, and thus, the court could not grant a temporary injunction under Section 149(12).

The court also considered whether other sections of the Act could provide the necessary jurisdiction. Section 30(1)(b) allows the court to make interlocutory orders necessary for carrying out the Act. However, Pincus J found that the sought order was not necessary for this purpose but rather intended to circumvent the automatic discharge under Section 149(1). Therefore, Section 30(1)(b) did not apply.

Given that the application for interim relief was dismissed, the principal application for leave to enter an objection was also dismissed as it would not be pursued. The court ruled that it lacked the jurisdiction to extend the period of bankruptcy temporarily to allow for the hearing of the substantive application.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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